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THE TWO LAWS OF SEX STEREOTYPING 
NOA BEN-ASHER* 
Abstract: This Article offers two main contributions to the study of sex stereo-
typing. First, it identifies an organizing principle that explains why some forms 
of sex stereotyping are today legally prohibited while others are not. Second, it 
argues for a shift in the current rights framework—from equal opportunity to in-
dividual liberty—that could assist courts and other legal actors to appreciate the 
harms of currently permissible forms of sex stereotyping. Commentators and 
courts have long observed that the law of sex stereotyping has many inconsisten-
cies. For instance, it is lawful today for the state to require that unwed biological 
fathers, but not mothers, establish a relationship with a child as a condition for 
parental rights, but it is unlawful to exclude fathers from the category of “prima-
ry caregiver” for medical leave purposes. It is lawful to deny a female guard a 
position at an all-male prison but unlawful to refuse to hire a woman as a re-
searcher for a physics clinic. It is lawful to post a “men only” sign on a bathroom 
door but unlawful to post the same sign on a courthouse door. This Article offers 
an organizing principle that explains these seeming inconsistencies. The main 
thesis is that there are today two primary branches of sex-stereotyping law: one 
that prohibits stereotyping and one that permits it. The prohibiting branch reflects 
an event in antidiscrimination law that began in the 1960s and involved integrat-
ing the private sphere of the family with the public spheres of the market and po-
litical life. This event involved three steps: (1) a new rationale regarding the harm 
of sex stereotyping—anti-subordination; (2) a new concept of gender—gender 
role; and (3) a new articulation of an equality principle—equal opportunity for 
women to participate in the market and for men to participate in domestic activi-
ties. These shifts produced statutes and decisions that rejected traditional divi-
sion-of-labor stereotyping. In the same years, however, a parallel branch of per-
missible sex stereotyping flourished. This branch includes mandatory appearance 
codes in the workplace, schools, and prisons; denial of parental rights of unwed 
fathers; and sex segregation in bathrooms, locker rooms, prisons, and the mili-
tary. This Article argues for a shift of focus in the law of sex stereotyping. It un-
derscores the limits of an equal opportunity framework and argues that an indi-
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vidual liberty framework better captures the harms of many individuals who are 
today subjected to currently lawful forms of body stereotyping. 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of anti-stereotyping has shaped sex discrimination law since the 
1970s.1 Yet the law of sex stereotyping has many inconsistencies to offer.2 
Consider a few. It is lawful today to require students, employees, and prisoners 
to adhere to gender-based dress and grooming codes3 but unlawful to require 
that a female employee “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”4 It is 
lawful for the state to require that unwed biological fathers, but not mothers, 
establish a relationship with a child as a condition for parental rights5 but un-
lawful to exclude fathers from the category of “primary caregiver” for medical 
leave purposes.6 It is lawful for an employer to deny a transgender woman ac-
cess to the women’s restrooms7 but unlawful for an employer to deny a 
transgender plaintiff a job opportunity.8 It is lawful to deny a female guard a 
position at an all-male prison9 but unlawful to refuse to hire a woman as a re-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimi-
nation Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2000); Cary Franklin, 
The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 122 
(2010); David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of 
Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876–81 (1995). 
 2 See Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s 
Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of 
ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV 1333, 1364 (2014); Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 
DUKE L.J. 891, 926 (2014) (“[T]he normative underpinnings of the [sex stereotyping] theory remain 
elusive. When the Supreme Court declared that sex stereotyping violated Title VII, it never really 
explained why.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that an employer could require female employees to wear makeup without violating Title VII’s prohi-
bition on sex discrimination); Olesen v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 823 
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that prohibiting male students from wearing earrings did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because the gender-based restriction was substantially related to the legiti-
mate government function of curtailing gang activity); Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: 
Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 897 (2012) (identify-
ing, as one example, fifteen jurisdictions with specific maximum hair length requirements, mostly for 
male prisoners). 
 4 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
 5 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261–62 (1983). 
 6 Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 634–35 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 7 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 8 Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2012). 
 9 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
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searcher for a physics clinic.10 These outcomes may seem chaotic. This Article 
argues that they are not. 
This Article makes two main contributions. First, it identifies an organiz-
ing principle that explains why some forms of sex stereotyping are legally pro-
hibited while others are not.11 Second, it argues for a shift of legal rights 
framework, from equal opportunity to individual liberty, that could assist 
courts and other legal actors to appreciate the harms of sex stereotyping that 
are currently endorsed by lawmakers.12 
Scholarly debates have so far turned on the real or desired scope of legal 
limits on sex stereotyping. Scholars have articulated two principal views. Un-
der the broad view, most or all sex-based stereotyping by an employer, the 
state, or the federal government should be considered unlawful under Title VII 
and the Constitution respectively. Scholars supporting this view have argued 
that the “bulk of the work” in sex discrimination law since the early 1970s has 
been based on “the proposition that there are constitutional objections to 
‘gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes,’ that is to say, to ‘classifica-
tions based on sex . . . premised on overbroad generalizations.’”13 They have 
also emphasized the centrality of the anti-stereotyping principle, arguing that 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 1970s campaign as a litigator introduced a new and 
radical theory of anti-stereotyping that “dictated that the state could not act in 
ways that reflected or reinforced traditional conceptions of men’s and women’s 
roles.”14 These well-articulated positions represent a progressive feminist goal 
that favors expanding anti-stereotyping prohibitions. They often characterize 
judicial decisions that validate sex stereotypes as legal errors.15 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Vogan v. U.S. Oncology, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 2003) (allowing a fe-
male clinical research coordinator to pursue her claim that she was discriminated against when she 
was fired after going on pregnancy leave). 
 11 See infra notes 59–286 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 287–325 and accompanying text. 
 13 Case, supra note 1, at 1449–50; see also id. (“[V]irtually every sex-respecting rule struck down 
by the Court in the last quarter century embodied a proxy that was overwhelmingly, though not per-
fectly, accurate. Moreover, overbreadth alone seems to be enough to doom a sex-respecting rule.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 14 Franklin, supra note 1, at 88. According to Franklin, the theory’s scope may have even broad-
ened in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) and Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003), “which suggested that even ‘real’ differences . . . can-
not justify sex classifications that steer men and women into traditional roles in the family.” Franklin, 
supra, at 168. 
 15 See, e.g., Case, supra note 1, at 1474 (“The [Supreme] Court has notoriously failed to consider 
anything that is not a sex-respecting rule to violate the constitutional norm against the denial of equal 
protection on grounds of sex. What it has required is not that the protection be equal, but that the rule 
be the same.”); Franklin, supra note 1, at 173 (“[T]here persists in contemporary legal discourse an 
idea that the contours of constitutional sex discrimination law were set in the 1970s—that the kinds of 
sex stereotyping the second wave of the women’s movement challenged are the only kinds of sex 
stereotyping that constitute sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The anti-
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Others have advanced a narrow view of anti-stereotyping law. These 
scholars have claimed that the “dominant conception of American antidiscrim-
ination law [i.e., the broad approach] distorts and masks the actual operation of 
that law.”16 According to this view, Title VII does not prohibit all sex stereo-
typing and is better understood “as marking a frontier between those gender 
conventions subject to legal transformation and those left untouched or actual-
ly reproduced within the law.”17 Under this approach, Title VII’s anti-
stereotyping prohibition is, and ought to be, significantly less robust than that 
offered by those who support the broad view.18 Accordingly, gender stereotyp-
ing should not be prohibited in all its instances, and “[e]mployers may recog-
nize some norms without impeding [sex] equality in the workplace.”19 The 
goal of Title VII is “to end caste-like sex hierarchy in the workplace. . . . Yet 
not all gender norms are created equal, and not every gender difference should 
be equated with gender inequality.”20 
These debates reflect not only the centrality of an anti-stereotyping prin-
ciple in statutory and constitutional law but also its uncertainty. A systematic 
analysis of the dual nature of the law of sex stereotyping is necessary. This is 
the task of this Article. Katherine Franke has observed that assumptions about 
real biological differences between males and females have played a signifi-
cant role in shaping modern sex discrimination law.21 This Article shows how 
such assumptions produced today’s bifurcated law of sex stereotyping. 
The central thesis of this Article is that there are currently two primary 
branches of sex stereotyping law: one that prohibits stereotyping and one that 
permits it. The prohibited type of sex stereotyping is division-of-labor stereotyp-
                                                                                                                           
stereotyping principle that became law in those cases was more capacious and more capable of expan-
sion than this conventional wisdom suggests.”). 
 16 Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neu-
trality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 172 (2004). 
 19 Id. at 201. 
 20 Id. at 235. Yuracko adds that a man in a dress should not be protected against discrimination 
because he does not implicate the “substantive sex equality that is Title VII’s goal.” Id. at 202; see 
also Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 757, 761 (2013) (arguing that Title VII’s sex stereotyping prohibition reflects not a coherent 
antidiscrimination principle but only a pragmatic burden-shifting framework that turns on compliance 
costs for workers). 
 21 See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Dis-
aggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (“By accepting . . . biological differ-
ences, equality jurisprudence reifies as foundational fact that which is really an effect of normative 
gender ideology.”). But see Franklin, supra note 1 (“[VMI] makes clear that anti-stereotyping doctrine 
governs all instances of sex-based state action, whether or not ‘real’ differences are involved . . . .”). 
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ing.22 This is stereotyping that stems from the traditional presumption that wom-
en are homemakers and men are breadwinners.23 Courts have invalidated sex-
based alimony rules,24 exclusion of women cadets from the Virginia Military 
Institution,25 and exclusion of men from medical leave provisions;26 all of which 
represented traditional ideas about division of labor between men and women. 
By contrast, currently permissible types of sex stereotyping involve stereotyping 
along the male/female binary for a range of regulatory purposes. Examples in-
clude the inferior legal status of unwed fathers,27 sex-based mandatory appear-
ance policies,28 and segregated bathrooms and prisons.29 This Article takes a 
close look at the rationales and legal doctrines that underlie both branches of the 
law of sex stereotyping: the prohibited and the permissible. 
The prohibited type of sex stereotyping, division-of-labor stereotyping, is 
deeply rooted in anti-subordination rationales.30 In 1971, in Reed v. Reed, then-
litigator Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s brief was a turning point in rejecting tradition-
al division of labor stereotyping.31 This was part of a gender revolution that 
involved legislation such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, and later statutes such as the Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993 (“FMLA”).32 Bruce Ackerman has called this the Civil Rights Revolu-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 124 (discussing Ginsburg’s brief in Reed v. Reed and observing 
that “[i]n sections entitled ‘Male as head of household’ and ‘Women and the role of motherhood,’ she 
asserted that ‘[t]he traditional division within the home—father decides, mother nurtures—is rein-
forced by diverse provisions of state law’”). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). 
 25 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519. 
 26 Knussman, 272 F.3d at 634–35. 
 27 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142–43 (1989); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261–62. 
 28 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
 29 Pitts v. Thornburgh, 886 F.2d 1450, 1459–60 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding constitutionality of 
sex segregated prisons). Courts have invalidated body stereotyping that violates division of labor 
principles. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515; City of L.A. v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
711 (1978). 
 30 Ruth Colker has argued that two different principles, anti-differentiation and anti-
subordination, underlie equal protection jurisprudence, and that “anti-differentiation contends that it is 
inappropriate to treat individuals differently because of their race or sex, [while a]nti-subordination 
argues that it is inappropriate for groups to be subordinated in society[, thereby] reject[ing] policies, 
even if facially neutral, that perpetuate the historical subordination of groups, while embracing even 
facially differentiating policies that ameliorate subordination.” Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1986). 
 31 Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) (drawing an analogy between 
race-based and sex-based stereotyping and arguing that both should be impermissible because both are 
based on unalterable biological traits over which an individual has no control). 
 32 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(2012)); Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), Pub. L. No. 
103–3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C § 2612 (2012)). 
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tion and a Second Reconstruction.33 From Reed and on, the Court rejected var-
ious manifestations of division-of-labor stereotyping and the ideology of sepa-
rate spheres,34 relying on Ginsburg’s conceptualization of anti-subordination 
and “gender role stereotyping.”35 Since then, courts and other legal actors have 
rejected government and private policies that rely on stereotypes about female 
domesticity and male wage winning.36 
By contrast, three types of reasoning have supported the permissible 
branch of sex-stereotyping law. The first type is reasoning from cultural or 
community norms. A prominent contemporary example of this is the validation 
of sex-based appearance codes, including grooming and dress codes that man-
date how individuals should appear at work, in school, or in prisons.37 The 
second type of reasoning when validating body stereotyping is from “real” bio-
logical differences. An example of this is a line of cases that affirm the inferior 
status of unwed fathers,38 all of which reason primarily from biological differ-
ences in the reproductive process.39 The third type of reasoning in support of 
body stereotyping is from heterosexual risk and privacy. An example of this is 
the validation of sex-segregated spaces, such as prisons and bathrooms, based 
                                                                                                                           
 33 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 81 (2014) (describing 
these developments as “one of the greatest acts of popular sovereignty in American history”). 
 34 See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 
1970–1935, at xxiv (1977). 
 35 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736; United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34; Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685–86, 690–91 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); see also 
Case, supra note 1, at 1449 (“VMI is . . . the logical culmination of a long line of cases . . . . Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, author of the majority opinion, stands at both ends of this line . . . . All of the 
moving parts of the present law are fully articulated in her brief for the appellant in Reed v. Reed 
. . . .”); Franklin, supra note 1, at 124 (“Taken together, Ginsburg’s briefs in Moritz and Reed articu-
lated a new constitutional argument: Sex-based state action violates equal protection when it en-
trenches the traditional role divisions that confine men and women to separate spheres.”). 
 36 See infra notes 91–177 and accompanying text (outlining and analyzing the Court’s rejection of 
gender stereotyping). 
 37 See infra notes 181–233 and accompanying text (outlining and analyzing the Court’s ac-
ceptance of mandatory appearance codes). Part II examines how courts have distinguished mandatory 
appearance codes from the Court’s holding in Hopkins. See 490 U.S. at 235. 
 38 See infra notes 236–247 and accompanying text (analyzing the reasoning behind the inferior 
status of unwed fathers). 
 39 Interestingly, this type of body stereotyping has ancient roots in Western traditions. In the book 
of Genesis, for example, God cursed woman after eating from the Tree of Knowledge, declaring, “I 
will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy 
desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.” Genesis 3:16 (King James). Similarly, in 
Aristotle, the basic biological difference between men and women involves the ability to produce 
semen, which only man can do. See, e.g., Marguerite Deslauriers, Sexual Difference in Aristotle’s 
Politics and His Biology, 102 CLASSICAL WORLD 215–31 (2009) (discussing Aristotle’s Generation 
of Animals). 
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on perceived risk of sexual violence.40 Table 1, at the end of Part II, visualizes 
the split nature of the law of sex stereotyping. 
The bifurcated nature of sex stereotyping law is the consequence of an 
equality doctrine that is focused on integrating the family and the market. This 
Article underscores the limits of an equal opportunity framework and argues 
that an individual liberty framework better captures the harms of many indi-
viduals who are currently subjected to harmful body stereotyping.41 It also 
demonstrates how courts and other legal actors can rely on this individual lib-
erty framework to contest these forms of body stereotyping.42 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the decline of sepa-
rate spheres ideology in U.S. law in the second half of the twentieth century.43 
It begins with insights of feminist historians in the 1970s who articulated the 
metaphor of separate spheres to describe the traditional division of labor be-
tween men and women.44 It then gives a few illuminating examples of the 
Court’s validation of the traditional division of labor between men and women 
from the end of the nineteenth century until the 1960s.45 By 1971, a new femi-
nist opposition to division of labor stereotyping was fully developed in a brief 
that Ginsburg submitted in Reed, in which the Supreme Court ultimately held 
that “[b]y providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . simi-
larly situated, [a statute that prefers males over females to administer estates] 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.”46 The brief elaborated a new anti-
subordination rationale, alongside a new understanding of equal opportunity.47 
In the years that followed, the anti-subordination rationale and the equal op-
portunity doctrine became the centerpiece of sex discrimination law. This hap-
pened through judicial decisions that demanded the integration of women in 
the workplace and public spheres,48 and a parallel line of decisions that recog-
nized the role of men as participants in domestic activities.49 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See infra notes 225–233 and accompanying text (outlining cases permitting sex-segregation in 
prisons). 
 41 See infra notes 287–314 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 315–319 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 59–176 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 59–72 and accompanying text (tracking the use of the “separate sphere” meta-
phor in scholarly literature). 
 45 See infra notes 74–85 and accompanying text (detailing the cases using “separate sphere” justi-
fications in their reasoning). 
 46 Reed, 404 U.S. at 77; see Brief for Appellant, supra note 31. 
 47 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 5 (arguing that the Idaho law requiring males be 
preferred to females in the administration of estates mandated “subordination of women to men with-
out regard to individual capacity, creat[ing] a ‘suspect classification’ requiring close judicial scruti-
ny”) (emphasis added). 
 48 See infra notes 104–141 and accompanying text (outlining the cases that integrated women into 
the marketplace). 
 49 See infra notes 145–176 and accompanying text (outlining the cases that integrated men into 
family life). 
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Part II explores three contemporary legal and cultural rationales for vali-
dating sex stereotyping.50 First, to illustrate judicial reasoning from culture, 
this Part examines the strange life of sex-based appearance policies in the 
United States.51 With some exceptions, such codes are today legally permissi-
ble, based on the rationale that employers, schools, and prisons can legitimate-
ly require conformity with cultural and community norms as long as individu-
als are not denied equal opportunity.52 Second, to illustrate reasoning from “re-
al” biological difference, this Article examines the rights of unwed fathers53 
and the medical practice of surgeries on intersex infants.54 In both situations 
individuals are subject to harsh legal or medical consequences based on their 
biological sex. In the case of unwed fathers, based on the understanding that a 
biological father and a biological mother are differently situated in the repro-
ductive process, unwed fathers are treated as legally inferior to unwed mothers. 
In the case of intersex infants, since the 1950s parents have been consenting to 
“corrective” surgeries on infants whose genitals at birth do not conform to 
“normal” appearance of male and female genitals. This Part discusses the first, 
though unsuccessful, federal lawsuit in the United States that claimed the right 
of intersex infants to be free from such surgeries.55 Third, to illustrate reason-
ing from heterosexual risk and privacy, this Part discusses the application of 
Title VII’s Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) exception to 
same-sex privacy cases,56 and the judicial upholding of sex-segregated spaces 
such as bathrooms and prisons.57 
Part III argues for a change of framework in the law of sex stereotyping, 
in which individual liberty would replace equal opportunity as the leading 
principle.58 This Part demonstrates how a focus on liberty could bring within 
the scope of sex discrimination law those forms of harmful body stereotyping 
that have so far been neglected by it. 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See infra notes 177–286 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 179–233 and accompanying text (outlining and analyzing the Court’s ac-
ceptance of mandatory appearance codes). 
 52 See infra notes 180–232 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 236–247 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal reasoning behind the infe-
rior status of unwed fathers). 
 54 See infra notes 248–263 and accompanying text (highlighting important issues and new cases 
regarding “corrective” surgeries). 
 55 Complaint at 3, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2 :13-cv-01303-DCN (D.S.C. May 14, 2013), 2013 Wl 
1961775; see infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 264–275 and accompanying text (discussing the application of Title VII 
“BFOQ” exception). 
 57 See infra notes 276–286 and accompanying text (reviewing cases upholding the segregation of 
prisons and bathrooms). 
 58 See infra notes 287–321 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE DEMISE OF DIVISION-OF-LABOR STEREOTYPING 
A systematic feminist challenge to the sex-based traditional division of 
labor has been the primary characteristic of sex discrimination law in the Unit-
ed States since the 1960s. At the core of this legal reform is the idea of inte-
grating men in the family and women in the market by altering both the family 
and the market to facilitate greater sex equality.59 This has also involved re-
forming the family and the market to resemble each other.60 Making the family 
more like the market has included enforcing intra-familial contracts and recog-
nizing torts and criminal liability between spouses; making the market more 
like the family has involved reforms such as on-site childcare facilities and 
gender-neutral parental leave policies.61 This legal shift is well reflected in leg-
islation such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,62 the Equal Pay Act 
of 1963,63 and the FMLA.64 For the Supreme Court, the turning point was 
Reed, although the Court had already begun to express unease with division-
of-labor stereotyping.65 
A. Reasoning from Nature, Divinity, or Tradition 
The metaphor of separate spheres gained prominence in the 1960s when 
historians realized that the study of women’s history could benefit from the 
framework of ideology.66 In particular, historians identified the idea of “sepa-
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Cary Franklin, Separate Spheres, 123 YALE L.J. 2878, 2894 (2014) (“[A]ttention to and 
concern about interspherical impacts is one major theme in sex equality legislation and constitutional 
sex discrimination law.”); infra notes 104–177 and accompanying text (focusing on the integration of 
both these spheres). 
 60 See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1519 (1983). 
 61 See FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).  
 62 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 63 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d)(2012). 
 64 FMLA, Pub. L. No. 103–3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C § 2612 (2012)). 
 65 Reed, 404 U.S. at 77; see, e.g., United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54 (1960) (“[T]o act on 
[the] medieval view that husband and wife ‘are esteemed but as one Person in Law, and are presumed 
to have but one Will’ would indeed be ‘blind imitation of the past.’ . . . It would require us to disre-
gard the vast changes in the status of woman—the extension of her rights and correlative duties—
whereby a wife’s legal submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out, not only in the English-
speaking world generally but emphatically so in this country . . . .” ); see also Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“By adding [Title VII] Congress in-
tended to prevent employers from refusing ‘to hire an individual based on stereotyped characteriza-
tions of the sexes.’ . . . Even characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to 
serve as predicates for restricting employment opportunity . . . .”). 
 66 Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Words, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Womem’s 
History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 11 (1988). For a thoughtful analysis of the metaphor and its shortcomings, 
see generally id. 
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rate spheres” as central to understanding women’s experience of subordination, 
and located the origin of spheres in the antebellum era.67 One key text was 
Nancy Cott’s The Bonds of Womanhood, which examined how the idea of fe-
male domesticity was established in New England when nineteenth-century 
bourgeoisie made the “family pattern of domesticity” seem necessary and natu-
ral.68 The moral character of the domestic sphere, according to Cott, was 
formed in relation to the notion of the impersonal nature of the market: “The 
purpose of women’s vocation was to stabilize society by generating and regen-
erating moral character . . . . [T]he impersonal world of money-making lacked 
institutions to effect moral restraint.”69 The question became “how to regulate 
personal relations—how to regulate morality—if ‘the world’ had become an 
arena of amoral market struggles.”70 The answer was the creation of a sacred 
and moral field: the family.71 This conceptual separation of spheres, according 
to Cott, also created the necessary bonds for political sisterhood that would 
eventually lead to group consciousness and feminist legal reform.72 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases reflect the ideal of sepa-
rate spheres for men and women. Judicial reasoning in support of this ideal 
was typically either from nature, God, tradition, or a combination of those 
three. In 1873, in Bradwell v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld a law that 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1920–1960, 18 AM. Q. 151, 152 (1966) (identi-
fying nineteenth-century stereotypes about women that included domesticity, piety, purity, and sub-
missiveness as female virtues); see also Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the 
Status of Women in the Age of Jackson, 10 MIDCONTINENT AM. STUD. J. 5, 11 (1969) (viewing the 
“cult of true womanhood” as a vehicle for marking class differences, and especially elevating the 
status of middle-class women). See generally AILEEN KRADITOR, Introduction to UP FROM THE PED-
ESTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (Aileen Kraditor ed., 1968) 
(identifying the question of separate spheres as central to American feminism). 
 68 COTT, supra note 34. Later historians paid closer attention to class and race dimensions of the 
idealization of domesticity, showing how the emergence of a bourgeoisie class in the United States 
relied on the family and its practices of domesticity and unpaid female labor. See generally JEANNE 
BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC (1990); MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS (Robert Fogel & Stephan 
Thernstrom eds., 1981); CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK, 
1789–1860 (1986). 
 69 COTT, supra note 34, at 97. 
 70 Id. at 97–98. 
 71 Id. at 98 (“The Canon of domesticity answered by constituting the home as a redemptive coun-
terpart to the world . . . .”). 
 72 Id. at 99–100; see, e.g., id. (quoting a letter in praise of the importance of the women’s sphere, 
published in the name of an eighteen-year-old in the Ladies’ Magazine in 1831); see also CARL N. 
DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 
189–90 (1980) (arguing that the separation of spheres in the nineteenth century enabled women to see 
themselves as individuals with their own interests, thus marking an important milestone on the road to 
equality). 
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denied the plaintiff a license to practice law.73 The Court reasoned that, “as a 
married woman [she] would be bound neither by her express contracts nor by 
those implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create between at-
torney and client.”74 In a famous concurrence, Justice Bradley, reasoning from 
religion and nature, declared that “[t]he constitution of the family organization, 
which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, 
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and 
functions of womanhood.”75 
Although by the end of the nineteenth century women were included in a 
range of professions,76 judicial acceptance of traditional division of labor per-
sisted. In 1948, in Muller,77 the Supreme Court upheld a law that limited work-
ing hours such that “no female [shall] be employed in any mechanical estab-
lishment, or factory, or laundry in this state more than ten hours during any one 
day.”78 The Court emphasized that because “healthy mothers are essential to 
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of 
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the 
race.”79 The distinction between males and females was justified in that “[t]he 
two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 131 (1873) (noting that at the time the legislature 
enacted the statute governing admission to the bar it was generally regarded that “God designed the 
sexes to occupy different spheres of action”). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). For similar rulings and reasoning by state courts, see In re 
Lockwood, 9 Ct. Cl. 346, 351 (1873); Robinson’s Case, 131 Mass. 376, 377 (Mass. 1881); In re Opin-
ion of Justices, 107 Mass. 604 (Mass. 1871); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (Wis. 1875) (“The law 
of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of the children of our race 
and for the custody of the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor. And all life-
long callings of women, inconsistent with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profes-
sion of the law, are departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.). But 
cf. In re Ricker, 29 A. 559, 583–84 (N.H. 1890) (holding that a woman was entitled to practice law 
because attorneys were not official public officers, positions from which women were legitimately 
excluded under the common law). 
 76 See, e.g., Recent Case: Constitutional Law—Notaries Public—Appointment of Women, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 187, 187 (1896) (“The legislation in Massachusetts admitting women to the bar, and a 
later statute providing that such women as had qualified as attorneys might be appointed special 
commissioners to take depositions . . . indicate[s] an inclination of the community to grant to women 
at least some of the most important powers attaching to the office[s].”); Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, 
Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex, 1 SIGNS 137, 160 (1976), available at http://www2.widener.
edu/~spe0001/266Web/266Webreadings/HartmanCapPat.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT7D-ZGAU] (de-
scribing women working in the late 1700s and 1800s as teachers, telephone operators, typists, clerks, 
boot and shoe manufacturers, and cigar-makers). 
 77 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (“[A] state may, without conflicting with the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment, restrict in many respects the individual’s power of contract.”). 
 78 Id. at 416–17 (quoting 1903 OR. LAWS 148). 
 79 Id. at 421. 
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in the amount of physical strength . . . [and] the influence of vigorous health 
upon the future well-being of the race . . . .”80 
The ideology of separate spheres is also reflected in judicial decisions 
midway through the twentieth century. In 1948, in Goesaert v. Cleary, the Su-
preme Court upheld a Michigan statute that denied a woman the opportunity to 
be a licensed bartender unless she was “the wife or daughter of the male own-
er” of a licensed liquor establishment.81 The Court held that the state could, 
“beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar . . . despite the 
vast changes in the social and legal position of women,”82 and added that 
“[t]he fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long 
claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long 
practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the 
sexes, certainly, in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic.”83 The 
statute was understood as necessary to prevent “moral and social problems” 
that could arise if women were employed as bartenders.84 Although the Court 
did not repeat Justice Bradley’s dramatic separate spheres rhetoric, the out-
come and the tone of Goesaert reflect the idea that the proper sphere of women 
is the home. Up until the 1970s, courts and other legal actors relied on assump-
tions about the proper domestic and maternal roles of women,85 regularly up-
holding sex-based distinctions under the logic of protecting women’s domesti-
city (Bradwell), maternal bodies (Muller), and sexual morals (Goesaert). This 
would change dramatically in the 1970s. 
B. Responding from Anti-Subordination 
“[N]ot on a pedestal, but in a cage.” 
—Justice Brennan (Frontiero v. Richardson)86 
Since the 1970s, feminists made concerted efforts to integrate the family 
and the market. As Frances Olsen observed, the market and the family had 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 422–23. 
 81 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948). 
 82 Id. at 465–66. 
 83 Id. at 466. 
 84 Id. In full, the Court opined, “[T]he legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it 
believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate or 
reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition . . . .” Id. 
 85 Thirteen years after Goesaert, the Court persisted in furthering this ideology in Hoyt v. Florida, 
368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding a statute that excused women from jury service, and reasoning that 
“woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life”). 
 86 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. 
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been perceived in U.S. law and culture as moral opposites.87 The feminist 
strive to equality was characterized by calls to “enabl[e] women to participate 
in the market as freely and effectively as men do.”88 Janet Halley further elab-
orated that this early feminist commitment to the family and market binary 
involved two related themes: (1) constitutional equality as a leading princi-
ple,89 and (2) a structural understanding of the subordination of women in 
terms of private and public spheres, that is, the idea that men used the private 
and public divide to subordinate women.90 
This began in 1971, in Reed, which involved a challenge to a statutory 
preference of males over females as administrators of estates.91 Ginsburg and 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) submitted a brief that offered a 
new rationale based on anti-subordination and challenged the legality of divi-
sion-of-labor stereotyping.92 At the core of the Reed brief is an analogy be-
tween sex-based and race-based stereotyping. The brief compared the infa-
mous race segregation case Plessy v. Ferguson with Goesaert, in which the 
Court ruled that, with minimal justification, legislation could draw “a sharp 
line between the sexes.”93 The main point of this analogy was that stereotyping 
based on race and sex is impermissible because it is based on “congenital and 
unalterable biological traits of birth over which the individual has no control 
and for which he or she should not be penalized.”94 Applying a feminist-
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Olsen, supra note 60, at 1499–1500 (“[T]he home was referred to as ‘sacred,’ and home 
life was celebrated as the reward for which men should be willing to suffer in the earthly world of 
work.”). Olsen underscored that both have been posited as private spheres vis–à–vis the public state 
and that although “the values of the market provide the basis for a critique of the family, the values of 
the family provide the basis for a critique of the market.” Id. at 1528, 1575. 
 88 Id. at 1529 (emphasis added) (“Reformers who have sought to improve the status of women 
have tried reforming the family either (1) to promote equality within the family, or (2) to encourage 
husbands to behave altruistically toward their wives. Reformers have tried to improve the status of 
women in the market either (1) by requiring market actors to deal equally with women and men, or (2) 
by making the market more responsive to the needs of women.”). 
 89 Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE. J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 264 
(2011) (“Constitutional equality was the measure of everything . . . . Four key innovations come into 
our story . . . : 1. a focus on rights, 2. specifically rights to equality, 3. preferably based in the Consti-
tution, 4. to be realized through adjudication.”). 
 90 Id. at 265 (“Separate spheres ideology and the market/family distinction—typically dubbed the 
private/public distinction—constituted the key structural feature of the legal system and made law 
indispensable to the maintenance of male domination.”). In the article, Halley discusses a legal femi-
nist conference that took place at NYU School of Law in 1972, in which Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote 
that “the [Equal Rights Amendment]—not the Fourteenth Amendment or legislation—would be need-
ed to produce change.” Id. at 263 (quotation omitted). 
 91 Reed, 404 U.S. at 73. 
 92 Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 5. 
 93 Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466. Ginsburg’s brief noted that, regarding Plessy, “[s]imilarly, it was 
once settled law that differential treatment of the races was constitutionally permissible.” Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 31, at 5. 
 94 Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 6. 
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Marxist critique of group subordination,95 the brief argued that “[l]egal and 
social proscriptions based upon race and sex have often been identical, and 
have generally implied the inherent inferiority of the proscribed class to a 
dominant group. Both classes have been defined by, and subordinated to, the 
same power group—white males.”96 Namely, the main problem with sex stere-
otyping is that it supports the subordination of women to men. 
The anti-subordinationist rationale was accompanied by a new theory of 
equality: sex stereotyping denies women equal opportunity to participate in the 
economy, the market, and politics. Excluding women from traditionally male 
activities and vice versa denies individuals of both sexes equal opportunity.97 
The brief argued that “absent firm constitutional foundation for equal treatment 
. . . women seeking to be judged on their individual merits will continue to en-
counter law-sanctioned obstacles.”98 To make equal opportunity real, sex clas-
sifications must be examined as suspect.99 The opportunity at stake is a wom-
an’s opportunity “to be judged on [her] own individual merits”100 The brief 
emphasized “the political, business and economic arenas,” in which excluding 
women is “often characterized as ‘protective’ and beneficial.”101 Using a sub-
ordinationist metaphor to reverse the previous rationales of nature and tradi-
tion, the brief claimed that “[t]he pedestal upon which women have been 
placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.”102 
The Reed Court invalidated the statute under the Equal Protection Clause but 
without explicitly adopting Ginsburg’s anti-subordination rationale.103 
1. Integrating Women in the Market 
The feminist challenge to separate spheres ideology was incorporated into 
sex discrimination law in 1973, in Frontiero v. Richardson, when the Supreme 
Court adopted the anti-subordination rationale and the equal opportunity 
test.104 An Air Force officer and her husband challenged a law providing that 
spouses of male members of the uniformed services are dependents for pur-
                                                                                                                           
 95 For a different systematic analogy of feminism and Marxism, see generally Catherine MacKin-
non, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982). 
 96 Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 18–19. 
 97 See id. at 10 (“The distance to equal opportunity for women in the United States remains con-
siderable in face of the pervasive social, cultural and legal roots of sex-based discrimination.”). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 12. (“[W]ithout this recognition, the struggle for an end to sex-based discrimination will 
extend well beyond the current period in time, a period in which any functional justification for differ-
ence in treatment has ceased to exist.”). 
 100 Id. at 10. 
 101 Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 102 Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 21. 
 103 Reed, 404 U.S. at 77 (“By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus 
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 104 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
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poses of obtaining certain allowances and benefits but that spouses of female 
members are not unless they can prove actual dependency.105 The Court 
viewed the legislation as unlawful sex stereotyping,106 utilized the sex and race 
analogy and the idea of systematic class subordination,107 and relied on the 
framework of equal opportunity.108 Such sex-based distinctions “often have the 
effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal sta-
tus without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.”109 
Frontiero invalidated a government-imposed stereotype that reflected the tradi-
tional division of labor between men and women. 
Following this rationale, in 1975, in Stanton v. Stanton, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a statutory provision that obliged parents to support boys 
until the age of twenty-one but girls only until the age of eighteen.110 The 
Court rejected the assumption that “‘generally it is the man’s primary respon-
sibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ [and] that ‘it is a salutary thing for 
him to get a good education and/or training before he undertakes those respon-
sibilities,’ [but] that ‘girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and 
mentally before boys’; and ‘tend to marry earlier.’”111 These “old notions,” 
observed the Court, cannot justify sex-based discrimination.112 Women are “no 
longer [. . .] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family,” and 
their “activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding.”113 A 
younger age of minority for girls denies women the equal opportunity of be-
coming powerful participants in society.114 
Likewise, in 1979, in Califano v. Westcott, the Supreme Court invalidated 
a section in the Social Security Act that provided benefits “to families whose 
dependent children have been deprived of parental support because of the un-
employment of the father, but . . . not . . . when the mother becomes unem-
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. at 679–80 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (2012); 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (2012). 
 106 Id. at 684 (“Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic 
paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage . . . .”). 
 107 Id. at 685 (“[O]ur statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions 
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our 
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes 
. . . .”). 
 108 Id. at 686. 
 109 Id. at 687. 
 110 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975). 
 111 Id. at 10 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974) ), rev’d, 421 U.S. 7 
(1975)). 
 112 Id. at 14. 
 113 Id. The Court added that “the presence of women in business, in the professions, in govern-
ment and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, ante-
cedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice.” Id. at 15. 
 114 Id. (“[I]f the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected to 
attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-
typing society has long imposed.”). 
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ployed.”115 This policy explicitly reflected the assumption that men are prima-
ry breadwinners.116 The Court clarified that “[the statute] is obviously gender 
biased, for it deprives [mothers who are primary providers] and their families 
of benefits solely on the basis of their sex.”117 The Court characterized the tra-
ditional division of labor as a “‘baggage of sexual stereotypes’ that presumes 
the father has the ‘primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials’ 
while the mother is the ‘center of home and family life,’”118 and concluded that 
“[l]egislation that rests on such presumptions, without more, cannot survive 
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”119 
A central characteristic of the equal opportunity legacy is that even if a 
sex-based stereotype is statistically true (for example, women are shorter than 
men on average), employers cannot rely on it. In 1978, in City of Los Angeles 
v. Manhart, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of female employees challenging 
a benefits policy that was based on the different life expectancies of males and 
females.120 The female employees were required to make larger contributions 
to their pensions than male employees because, on average, female employees 
were projected to live a few years longer than their male counterparts; thus, the 
female employees’ pensions would, on average, pay out benefits for a longer 
period of time.121 The Court admitted that this generalization is “unquestiona-
bly true,” and that “the two classes are in fact different”122 but nonetheless held 
that “[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for 
disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.”123 
With physical stereotyping that does not trigger equal opportunity concerns, 
however, courts often validate sex stereotyping.124 
Perhaps the most oft-cited and illustrative decisions regarding integration 
of women in male-dominated spheres are Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins125 and 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 78 (1979). 
 116 Id. at 83. 
 117 Id. at 84. 
 118 Id. at 89 (citations omitted). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 706. 
 121 Id. at 705. 
 122 Id. at 707–08. 
 123 Id. at 708; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (2015) (mandating that a BFOQ exception 
should not be granted where “[t]he refusal to hire an individual” is “based on stereotyped characteriza-
tions of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling 
intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship.”). Mary Anne Case has 
called this “a Quest for Perfect Proxies.” See Case, supra note 1, at 1447; see also Post, supra note 16, 
at 19 (“[Courts] explain that the purpose of Title VII is ‘to eliminate subjective assumptions and tradi-
tional stereotyped conceptions regarding the physical ability of women to do particular work’” (quot-
ing Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
 124 See infra notes 177–233 and accompanying text (discussing permissible sex stereotyping). 
 125 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258. 
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United States v. Virginia (“VMI”).126 Hopkins and VMI reflect the Court’s 
commitment to enforcing equal opportunity of women in traditionally male 
provinces. In both cases, women were effectively denied access to male-
dominated fields; they were denied access to forms of social power. Notably, 
the sex stereotyping in Hopkins was not typical division-of-labor stereotyping. 
The Court held that an accounting firm violated Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
prohibition when it did not promote a highly qualified woman who was too 
masculine.127 Nonetheless, the plaintiff was effectively subjected to division-
of-labor stereotyping: she was not promoted to partnership in a situation 
whereas an equally positioned man would have been. 
Judicial reasoning from anti-subordination and equal opportunity also 
guided the Court’s VMI decision. In this case, Justice Ginsburg rejected the 
claim that biological differences can justify excluding women from military 
education.128 Ginsburg explained that although “‘[i]nherent differences’ be-
tween men and women . . . remain cause for celebration, . . . [sex] classifica-
tions may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, so-
cial, and economic inferiority of women.”129 Indeed, the main flaw in Virginia 
Military Institute’s (“VMI”) alternative scheme for women was that it did not 
provide women the same access to social resources that male VMI graduates 
enjoy.130 The Court concluded that “Virginia ha[d] shown no ‘exceedingly per-
suasive justification’ for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training 
afforded by VMI.”131 
Obtaining equal opportunities for pregnant employees has also been an 
important aspect of this spheres-integration legal reform. In 1978, Congress 
enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) as an amendment to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132 The PDA provides that Title VII’s pro-
                                                                                                                           
 126 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519. 
 127 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258 (“[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played 
a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had 
not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”). 
 128 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 552–53 (“The [Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL)] student does not 
graduate with the advantage of a VMI degree. Her diploma does not unite her with the legions of VMI 
‘graduates [who] have distinguished themselves’ in military and civilian life . . . . A VWIL graduate 
cannot assume that the ‘network of business owners, corporations, VMI graduates and non-graduate 
employers . . . interested in hiring VMI graduates’ . . . will be equally responsive to her search for 
employment.”) (citations omitted). 
 131 Id. at 534. 
 132 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-955, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (2012)) (“[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under 
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work 
. . . .”). Thus, Congress reversed the holding of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, holding that excluding 
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hibition includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”133 Courts have understood the goal 
of the PDA to be “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of 
. . . employees over other employees,”134 but it is unclear how much the PDA 
requires of employers. In 2015, in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the 
Supreme Court examined an employment policy that offered light-duty ac-
commodations to employees who were injured on the job and to disabled 
workers but denied the same accommodation to pregnant employees.135 The 
ACLU brief, submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, advanced anti-subordination 
and equal opportunity arguments,136 claiming that policies that disadvantage 
pregnant workers undermine the spheres-integrating goals of the PDA and Ti-
tle VII.137 The Court, however, took a much narrower approach when it re-
manded the case to the lower court to “determine whether the nature of the 
employer’s policy and the way in which it burdens pregnant women shows that 
the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination.”138 
Since the 1970s, judicial understanding of equal opportunity has been 
primarily about equal access to economic and social power.139 Ginsburg’s brief 
in Reed expressed the significance of equal opportunity in moral terms: 
“Where the relation between characteristic and evil to be prevented is so tenu-
ous, courts must look closely at classifications . . . lest outdated social stereo-
types result in invidious laws or practices.”140 The societal evil at stake, ac-
cording to the brief, is that “the dominant male society, exercising its political 
                                                                                                                           
pregnancy-related disabilities from employee disability plans does not violate Title VII. 429 U.S. 125 
(1976). 
 133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 134 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
 135 Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344–45 (2015). 
 136 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union  and a Better Balance, et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners at 5–6, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
1226) (“Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) to put an end to wide-
spread practices of discrimination against women because of pregnancy . . . . [W]omen were subject, 
as a class, to economic disadvantages and to exclusion from the public sphere more broadly once they 
became mothers . . . . To remedy this systemic discrimination, the PDA requires an employer to pro-
vide the same accommodation to pregnant workers as the employer gives to workers who are similar 
in their ability or inability to work.” (citations omitted)). 
 137 Id. at 6 (“Policies . . . that push pregnant workers out of the workplace when they need an 
accommodation that other workers receive perpetuate women’s second-class status in the workforce 
and in society more broadly. When women are forced to leave the workplace because of pregnancy-
related conditions . . . women suffer the very discrimination that Congress sought to eradicate. They 
lose income, economic security, and benefits, including health insurance, often with devastating re-
sults . . . .”). 
 138 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
 139 Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 40 (“[T]he status of women in the labor force is separate 
and unequal . . . .”). 
 140 Id. at 20–21 (emphasis added). 
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power, has secured women’s place as the second sex.”141 Integrating women in 
the market and public sphere is a first step towards challenging this societal 
evil. The other side of this legal reform is integrating men in the family. 
2. Integrating Men in Family 
Men have posed two types of challenges to division-of-labor stereotyp-
ing: one involving financial dependence on female spouses and the other in-
volving caregiving to children or other family members.142 
a. Men as Dependents 
In Frontiero, a statute embodied the presumption that husbands are finan-
cially independent, so when a female Air Force officer claimed her husband as 
a dependent, she had to supply evidence to support her claim.143 The Court 
invalidated the statute and rejected the stereotype that a man could not be fi-
nancially dependent on his wife.144 A similar anti-stereotyping logic appeared 
in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in which, in 1975, the Supreme Court invalidated 
a distinction in the Social Security Act that provided that “benefits based on 
the earnings of a deceased husband and father . . . are payable . . . both to the 
widow and to the couple’s minor children in her care,” but that “[s]uch benefits 
are payable on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife and mother . . . only 
to the minor children and not to the widower.”145 Justice Brennan observed that 
“the framers of the Act legislated on the ‘then generally accepted presumption 
that a man is responsible for the support of his wife and children,’” and that 
“such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of 
the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly 
to their families’ support.”146 
Similarly, in 1979, in Orr v. Orr, the Supreme Court invalidated an Ala-
bama alimony statute that provided that husbands, but not wives, may be re-
quired to pay alimony upon divorce.147 Once again, Justice Brennan rejected 
division-of-labor stereotyping and invalidated the statutory distinction.148 Jus-
tice Brennan reasserted that the old notion that it is the man’s responsibility to 
provide for the family can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. at 59. 
 142 See infra notes 152–176 and accompanying text (outlining cases that functioned to fully inte-
grate men into the family sphere). 
 143 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688–89. 
 144 Id. at 690–91. 
 145 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637–38, 653 (1975). 
 146 Id. at 644–45. 
 147 Orr, 440 U.S. at 270. 
 148 Id. at 279. 
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basis of gender.149 He further observed that “[n]o longer is the female destined 
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the 
marketplace and the world of ideas.”150 Brennan further clarified that “even if 
sex were a reliable proxy for need, and even if the institution of marriage did 
discriminate against women, these factors still would ‘not adequately justify 
. . . ‘ [this] statutory scheme.”151 The Court concluded that a sex neutral statute 
would end this discrimination against financially dependent men.152 
b. Men as Fathers and Caregivers 
Fathers have challenged laws or policies that reflect traditional division-
of-labor stereotyping in three differing contexts: (1) the tender-years presump-
tion in custody disputes; (2) legal rights of unwed fathers; and (3) the right to 
family or medical leave to care for newborns or other family members. 
First, lawmakers and courts have, state by state, abolished the gender- ste-
reotyping tender-years presumption, which provided that it is generally in the 
best interest of a young child to be raised by the child’s mother.153 As the Su-
preme Court of Utah put it, “the rule lacks validity because it is unnecessary 
and perpetuates outdated stereotypes.”154 The court added that “[t]he develop-
ment of the tender-years doctrine was perhaps useful in a society in which fa-
thers traditionally worked outside the home and mothers did not; however, 
since that pattern is no longer prevalent . . . . [T]he tender years doctrine is 
equally anachronistic.”155 Today, the sex-neutral “best interest of the child” 
standard is the guiding standard in custody determinations in many jurisdic-
tions.156 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Id. at 279–80 (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 10). 
 150 Id. at 280 (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14–15). 
 151 Id. at 281 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202–03 (1976)). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(b)(3) (2014) (“In determining parenting time or deci-
sion making responsibilities, the court shall not presume that any persons is better able to serve the 
best interests of the child because of that person’s sex.”); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (2006) (“The 
court shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child in accordance with the best 
interests of the child . . . the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in 
determining custody.”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41.24(3) (2013) (“[T]he court shall consider all facts in the 
best interest of the child. The court may not prefer one parent over the other on the basis of the sex.”); 
Garrett v. Garrett, 464 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (“[In] all proceedings . . . in which shall 
be involved the right to the custody and control of minor children, . . . neither parent as such shall 
have any right paramount to that of the other parent, but . . . the court shall decide only as the best 
interests of the child itself . . . .”); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (1973) 
(“[A]pplication of the ‘tender years presumption’ would deprive [the father] of his right to equal pro-
tection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 154 Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Pruitt v. Key, 203 So.2d 450, 453 (Ala. 1967) (“The paramount governing legal principle 
applicable to child custody cases is the welfare of the child, both presently and in the future.”); 
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A second category of challenges involves unwed fathers. In 1972, in Stan-
ley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that provided that chil-
dren of unwed fathers should be considered wards of the state upon the death 
of their mother.157 The statutory presumption was that unwed fathers are unfit 
parents.158 After his female partner’s death, Stanley’s three children were de-
clared wards of the state and placed with court-appointed guardians. Stanley 
challenged the statute.159 In a decision by Justice White, the Court agreed that 
not all unmarried men are presumably unfit parents and held that “denying [a 
hearing on parental fitness before children are removed from custody] to Stan-
ley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably 
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.”160 Similarly, in 1979, in Caban v. 
Mohammed, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that allowed for the adop-
tion of an unwed father’s biological child without his consent.161 The plaintiff, 
Caban, had been involved in the lives of his children from birth and was eager 
to raise them.162 The New York Domestic Relations Law at the time provided 
that consent for adoption would be required only of a parent of a child born in 
wedlock or of a mother of a child born out of wedlock.163 Consent of unwed 
fathers was unnecessary. The Court held that the distinction between unmar-
ried mothers and unmarried fathers was unconstitutional and that “maternal 
and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance.”164 In Stanley and 
Caban, the Court rejected the stereotype that men are not caregivers, but under 
different circumstances, unwed fathers have lost claims for legal recognition. 
In those situations, courts’ reasoning was based on biological difference in the 
reproductive process.165 
                                                                                                                           
Boardman v. Boardman, 62 A.2d 521, 527 (Conn. 1948) (“In any proceeding to determine the custody 
of a child, the controlling elements are his welfare and best interests.”); Wainwright v. Moore, 374 
So.2d 586, 587–88 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1979) (“It is well established in this State that in any proceed-
ing involving child custody the paramount and controlling consideration is the best interest and wel-
fare of the child.”). 
 157 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972). 
 158 See 37 ILL. COMP. STAT. 701/14 (1969). The statute defined a “parent” as “the father and 
mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and 
includes any adoptive parent.” Id. The term did not include unwed fathers. Id. 
 159 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
 160 Id. at 654, 658. But see id. at 665 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he biological role of the 
mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the 
bonds resulting from the male’s often casual encounter.”). 
 161 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979) (challenging N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 
(McKinney 2016). 
 162 Id. at 389. 
 163 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(b)–(c) (emphasis added); see also Caban, 441 U.S. at 385. 
 164 Caban, 441 U.S. at 382, 389. 
 165 See infra notes 236–247 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal reasoning behind the 
inferior status of unwed fathers). 
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A third type of successful challenge to division-of-labor stereotyping has 
involved the right of fathers to take leave to care for a newborn or a spouse. 
For instance, in 2004, in Knussman v. Maryland, a state police employee 
sought leave to care for his newborn after his wife had suffered from serious 
medical complications during and after the pregnancy.166 A Maryland statute 
enabled “primary care givers” to “use . . . up to 30 days of accrued sick leave 
to care for [a newborn] child . . . .”167 Knussman, however, was told that he did 
not qualify as a “primary care giver” because fathers “couldn’t breastfeed a 
baby.”168 This categorical exclusion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
was unlawful sex discrimination, because “‘overbroad generalizations about 
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females’ will not 
suffice.”169 The court observed that “gender classifications that appear to rest 
on nothing more than conventional notions about the proper station in society 
for males and females have been declared invalid time and again by the Su-
preme Court.”170 
Another distinct manifestation of the Supreme Court’s rejection of divi-
sion-of-labor stereotyping appeared in 2003, in Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs.171 The issue in Hibbs was whether individuals could re-
cover against the state for money damages under the FMLA’s provision that 
entitles eligible employees to up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for a range of 
reasons.172 The Court held that Congress had acted within its power when it 
abrogated state immunity for FMLA’s leave provisions. The Court observed 
that FMLA “aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimina-
tion in the workplace” and that the statutory goal was to promote the integra-
tion of women in the workforce by recognizing male employees as potential 
caregivers.173 Despite Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, “the persis-
tence of such unconstitutional discrimination by the States justifies Congress’ 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Knussman, 272 F.3d at 628. Knussman argued that the state violated the Equal Protection 
Clause and the FMLA when it denied his request for a thirty-day leave to care for his newborn. Id. at 
631. The district court vacated a jury verdict in employee’s favor on FMLA claim but entered judg-
ment in his favor on equal protection claim and approved a $375,000 damages award. Knussman v. 
Maryland, 65 F. Supp. 2d 353, 360 (D. Md. 1999), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 
2001). The personnel officer appealed. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 627. 
 167 MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 7-508(a)(1) (1994). By contrast, a “[s]econdary care 
giver” was entitled under the statutory provision to use up to ten days of such accrued sick leave. Id. 
§ 7-508(b)(1). 
 168 Knussman, 272 F.3d at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169 Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725. 
 172 FMLA § 2612 (a)(1)(C)(2012); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724. 
 173 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728, 736. 
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passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”174 Thus, the Court upheld the FMLA 
as a statute that sought to demolish a stereotype of women as primary caregiv-
ers.175 
In sum, the brief in Reed announced a gender event in sex discrimination 
law: gender role stereotyping became the primary site for feminist legal re-
form. This event involved integrating the private sphere of the family with the 
public spheres of the market and political life.176 Three conceptual novelties 
reflect this event: (1) a new rationale regarding the harm of sex stereotyping: 
anti-subordination; (2) a new concept of gender: gender role; and (3) a new 
articulation of an equality principle: equal opportunity. The opportunity at 
stake is an opportunity for women to participate in the market and for men to 
participate in domestic activities. Males were granted equal opportunity to en-
gage in a range of domestic activities in Orr, Caban, Stanley, and Hibbs; and 
women to engage in market and political activities in Reed, Frontiero, VMI, 
and Hopkins. Table 1 below visualizes these three conceptual shifts. 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF BODY STEREOTYPING 
Although stereotypes about division of labor are regularly invalidated 
even when based on real or perceived physical differences, sex stereotypes that 
do not reflect traditional division-of-labor stereotyping are regularly validat-
ed.177 Three different kinds of reasoning have appeared in support of currently 
permissible body stereotyping: (1) reasoning from cultural or community 
norms, (2) reasoning from “real” biological differences, and (3) reasoning from 
heterosexual desire. This Part analyzes these three types of reasoning by exam-
ining representative illustrations in today’s law of sex stereotyping.178 
A. Reasoning from Cultural or Community Norms 
Across different areas of life, courts have validated mandatory sex-based 
appearance codes, reasoning that it is legitimate to require individuals to ad-
here to dress or grooming codes that are considered culturally appropriate. The 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (adding that “stereotype-based beliefs about the 
allocation of family duties remained firmly rooted, and employers’ reliance on them in establishing 
discriminatory leave policies remained widespread”). 
 175 Id. at 737. 
 176 Of sex discrimination law scholars, Cary Franklin’s account of the anti-stereotyping principle 
is descriptively closest to the account offered here. See Franklin, supra note 1, at 168 (emphasizing the 
holdings in VMI and Hibbs, “which suggested that even ‘real’ differences . . . cannot justify sex classi-
fications that steer men and women into traditional roles in the family”). 
 177 E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 53–34 (1996); City of L.A. v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 708 (1978). 
 178 See notes 177–288 and accompanying text. The purpose of this Article is not to identify all 
instances of currently valid body stereotyping but to examine the current ways that body stereotyping 
is justified. 
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leading equality doctrine that courts apply in these cases is the equal burdens 
doctrine, according to which, if both sexes are equally (even if differently) 
burdened by a policy, that policy can be upheld. 
1. Appearance at Work 
Since the 1970s, employees have challenged appearance policies in the 
workplace that mandate female femininity and male masculinity.179 In the early 
1970s, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),180 fol-
lowed by some courts,181 viewed sex-based appearance policies as violating 
Title VII. The fate of these policies, however, lay elsewhere. Many federal 
courts since the 1970s have validated sex-based appearance codes,182 leading 
the EEOC to concede in 1981 that legal authorities had not adopted its original 
progressive position.183 
Under the oft-applied equal burdens test, courts have regularly held that 
sex-based appearance policies do not violate Title VII because they “do not 
pose distinct employment disadvantages for one sex. Neither sex is elevated by 
                                                                                                                           
 179 For discussion of early appearance cases, see generally Post, supra note 16. 
 180 See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 847 (1972) (“To main-
tain one employment standard for females and another for males discriminates because of sex . . . and 
is unlawful unless the employer demonstrates the applicability of the narrow [BFOQ] exception . . . 
[which w]e hold, . . . as a matter of law, . . . is not applicable to . . . Employer’s long hair policy.”). 
For background on the legal history of appearance policies, see generally Case, supra note 2. 
 181 See, e.g., Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 662, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (“Males 
with long hair conjure up exactly the sort of stereotyped responses Congress intended to be discarded 
. . . . Title VII does not permit the employer to indulge such generalizations.”); Donohue v. Shoe 
Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (“[T]he EEOC has determined that the re-
fusal to hire a male because of the length of his hair, when women who wear their hair at a similar 
length are hired, constitutes a violation of [Title VII]. This interpretation of the Act by the EEOC is 
entitled to great deference by the courts . . . .”). 
 182 Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1216 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that female anchor 
was not subjected to sex discrimination through the network’s appearance standards); Knott v. Mo. 
Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding employer personal appearance regula-
tions that restricted hair length for men but not for women); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, 351 F. Supp. 
402, 404 (D.D.C 1972) (holding employer supermarket’s grooming standards to not constitute sex 
discrimination). 
 183 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 619.1 (Oct. 1981). Several commentators have criticized this 
position, based on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins’s observation that “‘in forbidding employers to dis-
criminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” 490 U.S. 229, 251 (1989) 
(quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13); see, e.g., Case, supra note 2; Cary Franklin, Inventing the 
“Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1374 (“In order to explain 
this line of cases, it seems clear that ‘we would have to seek an explanation in the domain of social, 
not formal, logic.’”) (citation omitted); Kramer, supra note 2. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The 
Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (2009); Erica Williamson, Moving Past Hippies and 
Harassment: A Historical Approach to Sex, Appearance and the Workplace, 56 DUKE L.J. 681 
(2006). 
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these regulations to an appreciably higher occupational level than the other.”184 
Employers today can mandate female femininity and male masculinity in the 
workplace. The Supreme Court rejected a similar rationale of equal burdens in 
Brown v. Board of Education, in the context of race-based segregation in 
schools,185 and in Loving v. Virginia, in the context of miscegenation laws.186 
Lawmakers, however, have refused to adopt an analogous anti-classificationist 
stance in sex discrimination cases. 
Courts have recently applied the equal burdens test in casino cases such 
as Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. and Schiavo v. Marina District Devel-
opment Co.187 In these cases, courts rejected Title VII challenges to sex-based 
appearance policies brought by female employees, and, in particular, their reli-
ance on the anti-stereotyping theory from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.188 The 
Jespersen court opined that, in contrast with Ann Hopkins’s situation, applying 
makeup does not objectively harm a female bartender’s opportunities in a casi-
no and held that “objection to the makeup requirement, without more, can 
[not] give rise to a claim of sex stereotyping under Title VII.”189 The New Jer-
sey Supreme Court applied the same equal burdens test to the Borgata’s 
“Babes Program” and reasoned explicitly from cultural norms.190 The court 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (1973) (“Title VII never was intended to 
encompass sexual classifications having only an insignificant effect on employment opportunities.”); 
see also Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215 (holding that “a reasonable dress or grooming code is a proper man-
agement prerogative”). 
 185 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (“We come then to the question present-
ed: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physi-
cal facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of 
equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.”). 
 186 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (“Because we reject the notion that the mere ‘equal 
application’ of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the 
State’s contention that these statutes should be upheld . . . .”). 
 187 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006); Schiavo v. Marina 
Dist. Dev. Co., No. ATL-L-2833-08, 2013 WL 4105183, at *14 (N.J. Super. Jul. 18, 2013); see also 
Rohaly v. Rainbow Playground Depot, Inc., No. 56478-1-I, 2006 WL 2469143, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 28, 2006) (“We conclude this case is more like Jespersen . . . . Because the policy imposes re-
quirements on both sexes and does not appear to impose unequal burdens on its face, we conclude 
PNW’s dress code policy is not facially discriminatory.”). 
 188 The Ninth Circuit also rejected Darlene Jespersen’s claim that Harrah’s makeup requirement 
established a prima facie case of discriminatory intent in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e)(1) (2012). Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (“[S]ex-based difference in appearance standards alone 
[does not], without any further showing of disparate effects, create . . . a prima facie case.”). 
 189 Id. (“If we were to [accept the sex stereotyping claim], we would come perilously close to 
holding that every grooming, apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally 
offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimina-
tion.”). 
 190 Schiavo, 2013 WL 4105183, at *14 (“[A]ccording to Plaintiffs’ Counsel unlawful gender 
stereotyping occurs whenever an employer requires females to appear attractive in a manner that they 
deem to be ‘stereotypical’—even if an equally burdensome request is made of males. Nonetheless, 
that is not the law.”). 
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clarified that an employer can lawfully require women to appear stereotypical-
ly feminine, show a preference for employees who possess a sexually attrac-
tive appearance, and “rely upon ‘stereotypical notions of how men and women 
should appear’ when expressing these preferences.”191 It is lawful, according to 
the court, to require conformity to sex-based cultural stereotypes so long as the 
equal opportunity rationale is not violated.192 On the other hand, personal ap-
pearance challenges have been successful when courts have found that plain-
tiffs had suffered other harms such as violation of equal opportunity,193 sexual 
harassment,194 or when employers did not satisfy the equal burdens test.195 
Similar reasoning appears in the judicial sanctioning of grooming re-
quirements for men.196 For example, in 1973, in Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., the 
D.C. Circuit Court observed that hair-length policies “do not limit employment 
opportunities by making distinctions based on immutable personal characteris-
tics, which do not represent any attempt by the employer to prevent the em-
ployment of a particular sex.”197 Hair length regulations “do not pose distinct 
employment disadvantages for one sex. Neither sex is elevated by these regu-
                                                                                                                           
 191 Id. (citing Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112; Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214–15). 
 192 Id. (“What employers cannot do is use stereotypes to impose a professional disadvantage on 
one sex or the other nor can they punish one sex for having a personal or physical trait that is praised 
in the other.”) (citations omitted). 
 193 See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1043 (8th Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that plaintiff who did not conform to feminine sex stereotypes “presented sufficient evidence to 
make out a prima facie case on her claims for sex discrimination and retaliation and a sufficient show-
ing . . . that [employer’s] proffered reason for her termination was pretextual”). 
 194 EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y 1981) (“[Defendants] required 
[plaintiff] to wear, as a condition of her employment, a uniform that was revealing and sexually pro-
vocative and could reasonably be expected to subject her to sexual harassment when worn on the job 
and a uniform that Sage and Monahan Cleaners knew did subject her to such harassment.”). 
 195 E.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (“United’s weight policy 
‘applie[d] less favorably to one gender,’ [since] men could generally weigh as much as large-framed 
men whether they were large-framed or not, while women could generally not weigh more than medi-
um-framed women.” (citation omitted)); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 
1982) (“Where a claim of discriminatory treatment is based upon a policy which on its face applies 
less favorably to one gender, this court has held that the plaintiff need not otherwise establish the 
presence of discriminatory intent.”); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 
(7th Cir. 1979) (requiring only female employees to wear uniforms is “disparate treatment,” “demean-
ing to women” and “based on offensive stereotypes”); O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Ware-
house, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (requiring only women to wear uniforms is fa-
cially discriminatory); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973) (requiring 
only female flight attendants to wear contact lenses instead of glasses is discriminatory). 
 196 E.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t, 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y. 
Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 
(8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. 
Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974); Boyce, 351 F. Supp. at 403. 
 197 Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337 (emphasis added); see also Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 
(“[G]rooming codes or length of hair is related more closely to the employer’s choice of how to run a 
business than to equality of employment opportunity.”). 
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lations to an appreciably higher occupational level than the other.”198 Sex-
based classifications that regulate appearance are deemed harmless, as “Title 
VII never was intended to encompass sexual classifications having only an 
insignificant effect on employment opportunities.”199 
This did not change even after the Court in Hopkins included gender ste-
reotyping within the realm of prohibited sex discrimination. For example, in 
1996, in Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that it was permissible to fire a male employee for having long 
hair in violation of a policy that allowed women but not men to have long 
hair.200 The Second Circuit reiterated the rule that grooming policies do not 
violate Title VII because “hair length policies are not within the statutory goal 
of equal employment . . . . [S]uch employment policies have only a de minimis 
effect . . . .”201 
There is an important exception here. In recent years, transgender plain-
tiffs have prevailed in personal appearance challenges.202 This reflects a broad 
legal and cultural pattern of recognizing and protecting transgender individu-
als.203 Recently, the President has also named transgender rights among the 
                                                                                                                           
 198 Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Tavora, 101 F.3d at 909. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding, in a § 1983 case 
alleging an Equal Protection violation, that “discrimination against a transgender individual because 
of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (“[E]mployers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or 
otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would 
not occur but for the victim’s sex.”); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(holding that a transgender plaintiff could plead a Hopkins-like claim that she had been discriminated 
against because of her failure to appear masculine enough for her employer); Macy v. Holder, 
E.E.O.C. Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 at *1 (2012); see also Case, supra note 2. 
 203 According to a 2011 national survey, transgender people are still “four times as likely as the 
general population to live in extreme poverty, twice as likely to be unemployed and almost twice as 
likely to be homeless.” Recent Administrative Policy: Administrative Law-Identity Records-Social 
Security Administration Eliminates Surgical Requirement for Changing Trans Individuals' Gender 
Markers.-Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System, Rm 10212.200 Changing Numident 
Data for Reasons Other Than Name Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1863–64 (2014) (citing JAIME 
M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 
2–4 (2011)). Forty-seven percent of survey respondents reported experiencing adverse job outcomes 
because of their trans status, and significant numbers also reported being refused medical care, suffer-
ing sexual assault in prison, and being harassed and assaulted in school as a result of their trans or 
gender-nonconforming status. Id. at 1864. In addition, 41% percent of survey respondents had at-
tempted suicide, compared to 1.6% of the general population. Id. Things have improved, however, in 
the areas of Medicare and Social Security. See Recent Administrative Policy, supra, at 1863; Parker 
Marie Molloy, HHS Lifts Medicare Ban on Gender-Confirming Surgeries, ADVOCATE (May 30, 
2014), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2014/05/30/hhs-lifts-medicare-ban-gender-
confirming-surgeries [https://perma.cc/TQ3Y-2777]. 
1214 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1187 
civil rights issues of our time.204 Rulings in favor of transgender litigants have 
often depended on an ongoing medical understanding of transgender identi-
ties.205 The basic principle in these decisions is that employers can lawfully 
enforce stereotypical appearance norms, but transgender plaintiffs are excep-
tional because they suffer a special harm understood through the diagnostic 
category of gender dysphoria206 (previously known as “Gender Identity Disor-
der”).207 An outlier in this regard is the EEOC’s recent Macy v. Holder deci-
sion, which, without mentioning any clinical criteria, established that, “[w]hen 
an employer discriminates against someone because the person is transgender, 
the employer has engaged in disparate treatment ‘related to the sex of the vic-
tim.’”208 Exceptions for transgender plaintiffs have not involved reassessing 
norms of mandatory appearance; they only suspend these norms when they 
harm individual transgender identified plaintiffs. 
Interestingly, the shift from the early 1970s, when plaintiffs prevailed in 
challenges to appearance codes, to today, when they do not,209 has involved a 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2015) (“That’s why we defend 
free speech, and advocate for political prisoners, and condemn the persecution of women, or religious 
minorities, or people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. We do these things not only be-
cause they’re right, but because they make us safer.”); see also Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama An-
nounces Executive Order Protecting Federal Employees from Gender-Identity Discrimination, WASH. 
POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/06/30/obama-
announces-executive-order-protecting-federal-employees-from-gender-identity-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/QJ5R-6F9G] (“President Obama . . . announced he would sign an executive order 
protecting federal employees from being discriminated against on the basis of gender identity . . . .”). 
 205 See generally Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and 
Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51 (2006); Jennifer Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man 
(or Woman), but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90 (2006); Dean Spade, Resisting 
Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15 (2003). 
 206 See, e.g., Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 905 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (declaring it “undis-
puted that [plaintiff’s Gender Identity Disorder] is a serious medical need” in a case alleging that a 
prison failed to follow the Standards of Care when it followed its own preferred course of treatment 
rather than the treatment the prisoner would have chosen); Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212–13 (refer-
ring to plaintiff’s diagnosis of gender dysphoria in holding that transsexual employees may bring 
claims for discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII); Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 
606 (Me. 2014) (holding that a school violated the Maine Human Rights Act when it prohibited a 
transgender student diagnosed with gender dysphoria from using the girls’ bathroom). 
 207 THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, § 302.85 (Am. Psy-
chiatric Ass’n 4th ed., 1994). The psychiatric diagnosis of “Gender Identity Disorder” first appeared 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980—the first DSM to exclude ho-
mosexuality as a psychiatric disorder—and as Eve Sedgwick has claimed, gender has replaced homo-
sexuality as a site of diagnosis. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids up Gay: The War 
on Effeminate Boys, 29 SOCIAL TEXT 18, 20 (1991); see also Kevin M. Barry, Brian Farrell, Jennifer 
L. Levi & Neelima Vanguri, A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 516–26 (2016) (discussing the history of the Gender Dysphoria diagno-
sis as well as its treatment under the law). 
 208 Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (Apr. 20, 2012). 
 209 See notes 180–235 and accompanying text (outlining and analyzing the Court’s acceptance of 
mandatory appearance codes). 
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shift in reasoning from liberty to equality. For example, in Donohue v. Shoe 
Corporation of America, a hair-length challenge decided in 1972, a federal 
court observed that, “[i]n our society we too often form opinions of people on 
the basis of skin color, religion, national origin, style of dress, hair length, and 
other superficial features,” and “[t]hat tendency to stereotype people is at the 
root of some of the social ills that afflict the country, and in adopting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to attack these stereotyped characteriza-
tions so that people would be judged by their intrinsic worth.”210 This libera-
tionist rationale was eventually dropped when courts and the EEOC shifted to 
an equal opportunity rationale.211 
2. Appearance in Public Schools 
A parallel shift occurred in public schools. In the 1960s and 1970s, female 
students successfully challenged policies that denied them the opportunity to 
wear masculine attire such as pants,212 and male students also attained relative 
but lesser success in such sex-based challenges.213 Notably, many of these ear-
                                                                                                                           
 210 Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that the 
complaint of a former shoe salesman who claimed that his employer discharged him because of length 
of his hair alleged a prima facie violation of Title VII); see also Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 
(2d Cir. 1973) (“We hold only that choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual’s 
personal liberty, and that any restriction on that right must be justified by a legitimate state interest 
reasonably related to the regulation.”); Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 666 (“The issue of long hair on men . . . 
is no different from the issues of race, color, religion, national origin and equal employment rights for 
women, all of which are raised in Title VII . . . . [T]he message of the Act is clear: every person is to 
be treated as an individual, with respect and dignity. Stereotypes based upon race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin are to be avoided.”). 
 211 See infra notes 287–321 and accompanying text. 
 212 Johnson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 60, Bingham Cty., 508 P.2d 547, 548 (Idaho 1973) (holding 
that a school dress code that prohibited female students from wearing slacks, pantsuits, or culottes 
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of sex); Scott v. Bd. of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 (Sup. 
1969) (finding invalid provision of school dress regulations prohibiting girls from wearing slacks 
except with permission of principal when warranted by cold weather); see also Natalie Smith, Elimi-
nating Gender Stereotypes in Public School Dress Codes: The Necessity of Respecting Personal Pref-
erence, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 251, 253 (2012). 
 213 See Recent Cases: Constitutional Law—Schools and School Districts—Prohibition of Long 
Hair, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1703 (1971) (observing that out of forty-one cases reviewed “students 
have lost in a slim majority of the cases, as courts have taken widely divergent positions on the hair 
issue”). Compare Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970) (ruling that a male student 
denied equal protection by public high school dress code limiting hair length of male students but not 
female students when school failed to offer an explanation as to why health and safety concerns 
should apply only to male students), Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970) (hold-
ing that a male high school student suspended for refusing to cut his hair has due process right of 
personal liberty not to cut his hair short and there is no state interest of decency, unattractiveness, or 
compelled conformity justifying his suspension), and Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 
1969) (holding that a student’s right to govern the style and length of his hair is a personal freedom 
protected under the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), 
with King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1971) (ruling that a lawsuit by 
male students who objected to a school regulation limiting the length of their hair failed to establish 
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ly decisions were grounded in the individual liberty interest in governing one’s 
hairstyle. From the 1980s and on, however, courts have tended to uphold man-
datory gender appearance policies in schools, especially for males,214 because 
anxiety about male effeminacy is deeply rooted in American culture.215 
As in the workplace, courts today utilize the equal burdens rationale, 
meaning that when both sexes are subject to dress regulations, they are per-
ceived to be equally burdened.216 For instance, the Seventh Circuit has recently 
clarified that “sex-differentiated standards consistent with community norms 
may be permissible to the extent they are part of a comprehensive, evenly-
enforced grooming code that imposes comparable burdens on both males and 
females alike . . . .”217 In that case, the court held that a “hair-length policy for 
the boys basketball team but for not for [sic] the girls basketball team” de-
prived male basketball players of equal protection.218 In other successful stu-
dent challenges, courts have relied on other exceptional grounds, such as reli-
gion and transgender status. For instance, in 2010, in A.A. v. Needville Inde-
pendent School, the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of a Native American family 
                                                                                                                           
“the existence of any substantial constitutional right . . . .”), Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216–17 
(6th Cir. 1970) (wearing of excessively long hair caused classroom disruption and constituted a dis-
traction from the educational process, and banning it did not violate students’ constitutional rights), 
and Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 1968) (banning long hair by school 
was not discriminatory under Civil Rights Statutes). 
 214 See, e.g., Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Tr. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. 
Supp. 1319, 1336 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (ruling that equal protection rights of Native American student 
were not violated by school dress code restricting hair length of male students where code was en-
dorsed for “reasonable, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the maintenance of discipline and the 
promotion of respect for authority”); Olesen v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 
823 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (prohibiting male students from wearing earrings did not violate equal protection 
because the restriction was substantially related to legitimate government function of curtailing gang 
activity); Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (S.D. Oh. 1987) (“School offi-
cials did not violate any rights plaintiffs might have under the First Amendment by prohibiting them 
from attending the Junior-Senior Prom dressed as members of the opposite sex.”); Hines v. Caston 
Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that school policy prohibiting wearing 
of earrings by male students did not violate equal protection as policy was substantially related to 
legitimate educational goal of enforcing community standards of dress in order to instill discipline); 
Jones ex rel. Cooper v. W.T. Henning Elementary Sch. Principal, 721 So. 2d 530, 532 (La. Ct. App. 
1998) (ruling that school rule prohibiting male students from wearing earrings did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because school presented sufficient reasons to establish that the sex distinc-
tion was related to education);. 
 215 SEDGWICK, supra note 207, at 156 (1993); Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex 
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 
46–56, 61–69 (1995); The Sissy Boy Experiment (CNN television broadcast June 7, 2011). 
 216 Harper, 655 F. Supp. at 1356. (“[T]he dress code requires all students to dress in conformity 
with the accepted standards of the community [and] ‘such regulations . . . are a part of the disciplinary 
process which is necessary in maintaining a balance between the rights of individual students and the 
rights of the whole in the functioning of schools.’” (quoting Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444, 446 
(6th Cir. 1971)). 
 217 Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 218 Id. at 579. 
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that challenged a sex-based grooming policy that required boys to wear their 
hair short.219 The court accepted a free exercise claim because the child 
“demonstrated a sincere religious belief in wearing his hair uncovered—visibly 
long.”220 At the same time, the court clarified that “the wearing of long hair 
and unconventional dress by most boys may be seen as an act of defiance—
and a rejection of authority.”221 Likewise, courts and lawmakers have increas-
ingly come to recognize the right of transgender children and youth to adhere 
to appearance codes of the gender of their identity.222 The University of Ver-
mont has gone even further in validating the choice of a third, neutral gender 
for its students, with no need for medical diagnosis.223 
Overall, with the exception of religious objection or transgender status, 
courts today readily enforce stereotypical gender norms in the workplace or 
schools, so long as these policies equally burden men and women.224 
3. Appearance in Prisons 
In an insightful study of prison dress regulations, Gabriel Arkles has 
shown how prisons today enforce gender norms by heavily regulating hair and 
clothing of inmates.225 Arkles observed that “[m]ost systems that regulate hair 
length do so only for men’s prisons.”226 Namely, cultural anxiety over male 
effeminacy and relative tolerance of female masculinity is manifested in prison 
                                                                                                                           
 219 A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). The court decided the 
case under a strict scrutiny test on state free exercise grounds only. Id. at 272. 
 220 Id. at 262. 
 221 Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
 222 See, e.g., Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 607 (Me. 2014). The Maine Human Rights 
Act (“MHRA”) was amended to add “sexual orientation,” which includes gender identity, as a pro-
tected class. Id. at 605 n.5 (citing P.L. 2005, ch. 10, §§ 3, 17 (2005)). 
 223 Julie Scelfo, A University Recognizes a Third Gender: Neutral, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/a-university-recognizes-a-third-gender-neutral.
html [https://perma.cc/76TL-7YRR] (“Vermont is at the forefront in recognizing the next step in iden-
tity politics: the validation of a third gender. The university allows students . . . to select their own 
identity—a new first name, regardless of whether they’ve legally changed it, as well as a chosen pro-
noun—and records these details in the campus-wide information system so that professors have the 
correct terminology at their fingertips.”). 
 224 See Case, supra note 2 (arguing that the court blended the sexuality claim with the gender 
claim and seemed to be more persuaded by plaintiff’s lesbian identity). But see McMillen v. Itawamba 
Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (“[Because the plaintiff] has been openly 
gay since eight grade and she intended to communicate a message by wearing a tuxedo and to express 
her identity through attending prom with a same-sex date [her] expression and communication of her 
viewpoint falls squarely within the purview of the First Amendment.”).  
 225 Arkles, supra note 3, at 862. 
 226 Arkles identifies fifteen U.S. jurisdictions with “specific maximum hair length requirements 
set forth in written rules,” adding that “[j]urisdictions without written requirements may still regulate 
hair length through other means, such as through staff commands or through harassment that incentiv-
izes conformity.” Id. at 897. 
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hair regulations as well.227 Arkles’ study also reveals that styles of dress that 
are associated with non-Whiteness, non-Christianity, or “non-mainstream po-
litical views,” are often banned.228 Almost all jurisdictions today differentiate 
between male and female inmate appearance, either by distribution of products 
or by directly prohibiting feminine dress in men’s facilities and masculine 
dress in women’s facilities.229 In this context as well, with the exception of 
transgender230 and religious231 prisoners, courts have been unreceptive to chal-
lenges of prison dress codes, often characterizing them as frivolous.232 
In sum, employers, schools, and prisons can today lawfully impose sex-
based appearance codes on employees, students, and prisoners. The supporting 
rationale for this kind of stereotyping is the expectation that individuals con-
form with cultural or community norms about how males and females should 
appear. The legal test typically applied when such policies are challenged is the 
equal burdens test. Part III of this Article argues that a liberty rationale may 
prove more productive in future challenges to such policies.233 
B. Reasoning from “Real” Biological Difference 
Two examples demonstrate body stereotyping that depends on reasoning 
from “pure” biological differences between males and females: the inferior 
status of unwed fathers and the practice of early “corrective” surgeries on in-
tersex infants. What these two examples have in common is that they are both 
justified by courts or medical experts purely based on perceptions of physical 
difference between males and females. Reasoning from biology differs from 
reasoning from cultural or community norms in the following sense: in enforc-
ing a community norm, the decision maker does not assume that the norm nec-
                                                                                                                           
 227 Id. 
 228 Examples include sagging pants, baseball caps, headscarves, doo rags, and hoods. Id. at 899–
900. 
 229 Id. at 901. 
 230 See Konitzer, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 908 (holding that a triable issue existed as to whether male 
prisoner, diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, should be allowed modest makeup, female under-
garments, hair growth, and removal items). But see Lee v. Young, No. 99-6012, 2000 U.S. App. LEX-
IS 28068, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (affirming district court dismissal of claim concerning male 
prisoner’s right to wear a female hairstyle and makeup as frivolous); Claybrooks v. Tenn. Dep’t of 
Corr., No. 98-6271, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15174, at *3 (6th Cir. July 6, 1999) (affirming district 
court dismissal of claim concerning denial of female clothing and hormone therapy to male-to-female 
(“MTF”) transgender prisoner as frivolous); Jones v. Warden of Stateville Corr. Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 
1142, 1145–46 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (dismissing claims concerning MTF transgender prisoner’s right to 
women’s clothing and makeup as frivolous). 
 231 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 866 (2015). 
 232 See, e.g., Wilson v. Dir. of Div. of Adult Insts., No. CIVS-06-0791FCDGGHP, 2008 WL 
927696, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) (recommending a claim concerning inadequate clothing in 
prison be dismissed as frivolous). 
 233 See infra notes 287–321 and accompanying text (arguing for a jurisprudence that goes beyond 
just “anti-subordination” to include liberty considerations). 
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essarily stems from the physical body. For instance, the judges who validated 
the makeup requirements in Jespersen did not base their analysis on the fact 
that there is something in the female body that necessitates applying makeup; 
rather, the rationale for enforcing such a policy is that it is a cultural or com-
munity norm that employers can lawfully mandate.234 The items in this Section 
concern reasoning from the body per se.235 
1. The Inferior Legal Status of Unwed Fathers 
Unwed fathers are consistently treated as legally inferior to unwed moth-
ers. In 1983, in Lehr v. Robertson, the Supreme Court ruled against an unwed 
biological father who was denied an opportunity to object to his biological 
child’s adoption.236 The Court denied Lehr’s claim to constitutional protection, 
reasoning that only “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the due process clause.”237 The Court underscored 
that “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitu-
tional protection.”238 Likewise, in 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Su-
preme Court rejected an unwed father’s claim for legal recognition—this time 
because the child was born of an extra-marital affair.239 Justice Scalia reasoned 
that existing judicial precedent protects “the marital family . . . against the sort 
of claim Michael asserts.”240 In Lehr and in Michael H., the Court differentiat-
ed between biological mothers and fathers purely based on biological sex. The 
biological bond of mother to child needs no further support to establish legal 
parentage, whereas the biological bond of father to child does. 
Similar reasoning from biological difference also appeared in Tuan Anh 
Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Services (“INS”), where the plaintiff 
challenged an immigration statute that governs the acquisition of citizenship 
by those born out of wedlock and outside of the country to a citizen and a non-
                                                                                                                           
 234 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 . 
 235 See notes 228–265 and accompanying text. 
 236 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 251 (1983). Under New York law, notice of an adoption 
proceeding had to be given to registered putative fathers as well as to other “possible fathers of chil-
dren born out of wedlock.” Id. Lehr did not fit into any of these categories. Id. at 251–52. 
 237 Id. at 261 (citation omitted). 
 238 Id.; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (upholding child’s adoption by 
stepfather where unwedded biological father had not petitioned for legitimation of the child prior to 
the filing of the adoption petition and provided only sporadic child support). 
 239 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131–32 (1989) (holding that a California statute that 
created a presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is child of the 
marriage did not violate due process or equal protection rights of putative natural father). 
 240 Id. at 123–24 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254–55 (1978). 
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citizen.241 The statute imposed stricter requirements for acquiring citizenship 
when the citizen parent was a father than it did for a citizen parent mother.242 
The Court validated this sex-based distinction on the grounds that “require-
ments on unmarried fathers that differ from those on unmarried mothers [are] 
based on the significant difference between their respective relationships to the 
potential citizen at the time of birth . . . .”243 Justice Kennedy emphasized that 
“[t]he difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a 
real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to ad-
dress the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”244 In 2008, the 
Ninth Circuit also upheld this statute in United States v. Flores-Villar, in which 
the plaintiff contested the different residency requirements for unwed mothers 
(one year) and unwed fathers (five years).245 The court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Nguyen and held the “the one-year period applicable to 
unwed citizen mothers seeks to insure that the child will have a nationality at 
birth.”246 
In sum, unwed biological fathers are treated as legally inferior to similarly 
situated mothers, and the primary justification for this has been the alleged 
                                                                                                                           
 241 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1993); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigr. & 
Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 57–58 (2001) (deciding the immigration status of Nguyen, a lawful 
permanent resident, who had been born out of wedlock in Vietnam after his U.S. citizen father ap-
pealed the decision of Board of Immigration Appeals ordering Nguyen’s deportation). 
 242 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1)–(4), (c) (“[A] person born . . . outside the United States and out of wed-
lock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the 
nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously 
been physically present in the United States . . . for a continuous period of one year.”). The statute set 
forth the following requirements for the child to obtain citizenship when the father is the citizen par-
ent: “(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing 
evidence, (2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person’s birth, (3) the 
father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the 
person reaches the age of eighteen years, and (4) while the person is under the age of eighteen years- 
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or domicile, (B) the father 
acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or (C) the paternity of the person is estab-
lished by adjudication of a competent court.” Id. In addition, § 1401(g) established a residency re-
quirement for the citizen parents of a total of five years, at least two of which were after the parent 
turned fourteen years of age. Id. § 1401(g). 
 243 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). 
 244 Id. at 70 (emphasis added). 
 245 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a)–(c) (1974)) (holding that plaintiff was not deprived of equal protection rights by different 
residency requirements for unwed mothers and fathers; that he lacked standing to assert substantive 
due process rights of his father; and that he lacked substantive due process right to parental involve-
ment). 
 246 Id. at 997. 
2016] The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping 1221 
naturalness of the biological relationship of mother and child versus the social 
construction of the father-child relationship.247 
2. “Corrective” Surgeries on Intersex Infants 
The practice of early normalizing surgeries on intersex infants is among 
the most harmful contemporary forms of sex stereotyping. An estimated one in 
2000 infants is born with anatomy and/or chromosome patterns that do not fit 
typical definitions of male or female.248 Since the 1950s, a medical practice of 
“corrective” surgeries became the standard pediatric treatment for intersexuali-
ty.249 These medical guidelines advised pediatricians that the genitals of new-
borns with inadequate size penises should be surgically removed so the infant 
can appear feminine, and that an over-sized clitoris in a female infant should 
be surgically reduced so as not to appear offensive.250 The theory behind these 
guidelines was that, regardless of chromosomal sex or internal reproductive 
organs, in order to become well adjusted, children must have genitalia that ap-
pear as either male or female.251 Since the 1950s, pediatricians and hospitals 
regularly made recommendations based on those guidelines, and many parents 
gave “informed consent” to such surgeries after being advised that this will 
give their child a chance for “normal” development and mature sexuality. The 
medical practice of “corrective surgeries” has not yet entered the scope of pro-
tection of sex-stereotyping law. 
In 1993, individuals who had undergone “corrective” surgeries formed 
the Intersex Society of North America (“ISNA”). ISNA’s mission was to “end 
shame, secrecy, and unwanted genital surgeries for people born with an anato-
my that someone decided is not standard for male or female.”252 ISNA and 
                                                                                                                           
 247 But see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding that statute that allows illegiti-
mate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 248 How Common Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency 
[https://perma.cc/4N59-UFN9]. 
 249 Ben-Asher, supra note 205, at 61 (“[I]f a newborn displays a penis that is less than two centi-
meters in length, ‘a trial of testosterone injections should be given . . . and the infant raised as a boy 
only when there is a very good response’ and that ‘testes should be removed soon after birth in infants 
. . . in whom a very small penis mandates a female sex of rearing.’” (quoting Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 
138, 141 (2000)). For genetic females, the guidelines advised that “infants raised as girls will usually 
require clitoral reduction.” Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 62 (quoting Our Mission, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org); see also 
Cheryl Chase, “Cultural Practice” or “Reconstructive Surgery”? U.S. Genital Cutting, the Intersex 
Movement and Medical Double Standards, in GENITAL CUTTING AND TRANSNATIONAL SISTERHOOD: 
DISPUTING U.S. POLEMICS 126, 128 (Stanlie M. James & Claire C. Robertson eds., 2002) (“[We] 
advocate that surgery need not be performed on children born with ambiguous genitals unless there is 
a medical reason (to prevent physical pain or illness).”). 
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other intersex-advocacy coalitions engaged in tireless political efforts that 
eventually led to two important developments. In May 2006, the U.S. and Eu-
ropean endocrinological societies published a consensus statement that re-
placed the term “intersex” with “disorders of sex development” (“DSDs”),253 
and the ISNA and medical allies published a consortium position with new 
patient-centered guidelines.254 As of today, early “corrective” surgeries are still 
performed in the United States and elsewhere though data suggests that the 
volume of surgeries has declined.255 
The first lawsuit challenging intersex surgeries in the United States was 
filed in 2013 in a federal court in South Carolina.256 The plaintiff was born in 
2004 with a condition called ovotesticular difference/disorder of sex develop-
ment (“ovotesticular DSD”), which is characterized by the presence of both 
ovarian and testicular tissues.257 While in the custody of South Carolina De-
partment of Social Services, a team of physicians recommended that he under-
go sex assignment surgery in order to make his body appear female.258 A phy-
sician performed sex assignment surgery on the plaintiff when he was about 
fifteen months old, removing his phallus and testicular tissue.259 Two months 
later, plaintiff was adopted by parents who initially raised him as a girl, but 
after realizing that he had developed male gender identity, are now raising him 
                                                                                                                           
 253 I.A. Hughes, et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 91 ARCHIVES 
OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 554, 554 (2006); see also Ellen K. Feder, Imperatives of Normality: From 
“Intersex” to “Disorders of Sex Development,” 15 GLQ: J. OF LESBIAN AND QUEER STUD. 225, 225 
(2009). Notably, many intersex activists and allies objected to the term “disorders” which would at-
tach unnecessary stigma. See id. (citing examples of “letters to the editor” sent to the Archives of 
Disease in Childhood). 
 254 INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., CLINICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF DISORDERS 
OF SEX DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDHOOD: CONSORTIUM ON THE MANAGEMENT OF DISORDERS OF SEX 
DEVELOPMENT 1–3 (2006). 
 255 A recent study in Britain has shown that after the new DSD guidelines were published in 
2006, a study of a group of adolescents compared to a similar group of adolescents who had been 
treated ten years earlier found that clitoral surgery remained common (93% vs. 100%, current cohort 
vs. historical cohort). Lina Michala et al., Practice Changes in Childhood Surgery for Ambiguous 
Genitalia?, 10 J. PEDIATRIC UROLOGY 934, 934 (2014). Concomitant vaginoplasty, however, was 
performed less frequently (80% vs. 100%, current vs. historical). Vaginoplasty revision surgery was 
also less commonly required (65% vs. 81%) although 24% of the recent cohort still required major 
revision surgery prior to intercourse. Id. A larger European survey showed the following surgical 
results: 52% and 44.8% of surveyed medical centers reported having performed fewer or similar num-
bers, respectively, of clitoroplasties than in previous years and only 3.4% reported an increase. Vickie 
Pasterski et al., Consequences of the Chicago Consensus on Disorders of Sex Development: Current 
Practices in Europe, 95 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 618, 618 (2009). 
 256 Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 13-1303 (D.S.C. May 14, 2013), 2013 WL 1961775. 
 257 Id. at 10–12. Physicians who evaluated plaintiff in the first months of his life determined that, 
with surgery, the child could be “raised, surgically reconstructed, and treated to be male or female.” 
Id. at 14. Shortly after birth, M.C. was placed in South Carolina Department of Social Services custo-
dy after his biological parents relinquished their parental rights. Id. at 11. 
 258 Id. at 15. 
 259 Id. at 2. 
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as a boy.260 Plaintiff’s complaint against the physicians who recommended and 
performed the sex assignment surgery and the Department officials who au-
thorized it, alleged that defendants violated his substantive and procedural due 
process rights to bodily integrity, privacy, procreation, and liberty.261 The dis-
trict court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the defendant 
“violated [plaintiff’s] clearly established constitutional right to procreation,” 
and that the complaint “state[s] a plausible claim that [they] violated [plain-
tiff’s] procedural due process rights.”262 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals , 
however, reversed, reasoning that “the alleged rights at issue in this case were 
not clearly established at the time of M.C.’s 2006 sex assignment surgery [and 
therefore] we need not reach the question of whether M.C. alleged sufficient 
facts to show that the surgery violated his constitutional rights.”263 
Interestingly, the plaintiff’s claims to bodily integrity, privacy, procrea-
tion, and liberty have significant overlaps with the claims of unwed fathers 
above. In both cases the leading rationale for the medical or legal norm is the 
physical nature of the male and female binary. In the case of unwed fathers, the 
reasoning rests on the different reproductive capacities of males and females; 
in the case of intersex infants, this reasoning rests on the importance of differ-
ent genital appearance of males and females. 
C. Reasoning from Heterosexual Desire 
A third type of reasoning that has supported sex-stereotyping laws and 
policies presumes that males and females are in importantly different catego-
ries for assessing risk of sexual violence. Under this presumption, males are 
perceived as real or potential predators and females as vulnerable and in need 
of protection. This rationale differs from the previous two in that it is about 
sexual desire, specifically heterosexual desire, and in that the adopted policy is 
often segregation of individuals based on biological sex. 
1. Title VII’s Same-Sex Privacy Exception 
Although Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in hiring and work condi-
tions, an employer can demonstrate that sex is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise”.264 Among the predominant sex-based BFOQ defenses is 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Id. at 2–3. 
 261 Id. at 22–25. 
 262 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 10, 12, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 13-1303 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 
2013). 
 263 M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 13-2178, at *9 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 2015). 
 264 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
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the privacy BFOQ, which allows employers to exclude potential employees in 
order to protect the privacy interests of customers of the opposite sex.265 As 
Amy Kapczynski has argued, “[s]ex-based BFOQs are of interest not only be-
cause they authorize acts that would otherwise be considered discriminatory, 
but because they are a key location where sexual difference is symbolized in 
the law.”266 Examples include refusal to hire men to full nursing positions in 
labor and delivery rooms,267 sex-based assignments in psychiatric institu-
tions,268 prisons,269 and nursing homes.270 
                                                                                                                           
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
To qualify as a BFOQ, “a job qualification must relate to the ‘essence,’ or to the ‘central mission of 
the employer’s business.’” Int’l Union, et al. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) 
(quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 
400, 413 (1985)). 
 265 See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex 
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 152 (2004) (observing that courts are “far more permissive of 
sex discrimination on behalf of privacy concerns than they are of discrimination on behalf of sexual-
titillation desires”); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1259 (2003) (observing that the same-sex privacy BFOQ “eclipses all oth-
ers in terms of its legitimacy, persistence, and breadth”). 
 266 Kapczynski, supra note 265, at 1259. 
 267 Veleanu v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., No. 98CIV.7455 (VM), 2000 WL 1400965, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2000); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159 (W.D. Okla. 1982); 
Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 
1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1982); Katt v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Decision No. 01850870, 1986 WL 
635587, at *3 (Nov. 5, 1986); see also Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., No. 01-C-21, 2002 WL 
34587531 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2002), rev’d, 594 S.E.2d 616, 624 (W. Va. 2004) (reversing and remanding 
by state supreme court on basis of genuine issues of material fact with explicit preservation of possi-
bility that privacy concerns could support gender as a BFOQ). 
 268 Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that sex is a 
BFOQ in a youth psychiatric facility); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 
376, 387 (S.D.N.Y 1992), aff’d, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that gender is a BFOQ in state 
mental health facility). 
 269 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335 (upholding a regulation prohibiting women from working in “posi-
tions requiring continual close physical proximity to inmates,” and finding “basis in fact for expecting 
that sex offenders who have criminally assaulted women in the past would . . . do so again if access to 
women were established within the prison”); Henry v. Milwaukee Cty., 539 F.3d 573, 583 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that same-gender “direct role model/mentoring form of supervision” was “necessary to 
achieve the [facility’s] mission of rehabilitation”); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 753 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he exclusion of males from these positions is ‘reasonably necessary’ to ‘the nor-
mal operation’ of the MDOC’s female facilities . . . a BFOQ would materially advance . . . the securi-
ty of the prison, the safety of inmates, and the protection of the privacy rights of inmates . . . .”); 
Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Ambat v. City of S.F., 757 F.3d 1017, 
1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[The] County has not met its burden of showing that there is no genuine dis-
pute over whether excluding men from supervisory positions in female housing units is a legitimate 
proxy for requiring that deputies in those positions not pose a threat to the safety of female inmates.”); 
Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that sex not a BFOQ for 
correctional lieutenants in women’s prison); Torres v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 838 F.2d 
944, 954 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that female sex not a BFOQ for guards in women’s prison); Forts v. 
Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying a sex-based BFOQ for prison guards because 
measures to accommodate inmate privacy concerns were available); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehab. 
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The same-sex privacy exception often presumes heterosexuality, male ag-
gression, and female vulnerability. Consider for instance the Transportation 
Security Administration’s (“TSA”) patdown policy which requires that “If a 
patdown is required to order complete screening . . . [t]he patdown should be 
conducted by an officer of the same gender.”271 Under this policy a “same-
gender” pat-down is not optional — it is mandatory.272 This rule assumes that 
the biological sex of the officer is relevant for performing the security task,273 
and it reflects an assumption of opposite-sex desire.274 The same-sex BFOQ 
responds to this presumed heterosexual desire by denying opposite sex con-
tact.275 
2. Segregated Spaces: Bathrooms, Prisons 
“A sign that says ‘men only’ looks very different on a bathroom door than a 
court-house door.” 
—Justice Marshall (City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.)276 
Preventing sexual assault and protecting sexual privacy have been leading 
justifications in segregating spaces by sex, including education, the military, 
restrooms, prisons, and athletics.277 In many such instances of sex segregation, 
                                                                                                                           
Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769, 781 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (rejecting a female-sex BFOQ for a prison guard posi-
tion because could avoid the conflict between privacy and equal employment), aff’d, 779 F.2d 50 (6th 
Cir. 1985); Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (re-
fusing to grant a male-sex BFOQ for corrections officers in a men’s penal institution because institu-
tional adjustments could be made to respect inmate privacy), aff’d, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 270 Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (“The job duties of male 
and female nurse assistants and male orderlies often require that such employee view or touch the 
private parts of their patients.”); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del. Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. 
Del. 1978), aff’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334, 1352–53 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Fulfillment of that responsibility 
necessitates intimate personal care including dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes 
and catheter care. Each of these functions involves a personal touching . . . .”). 
 271 Pat-Downs, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening [https://
perma.cc/2JPS-CZXK]. The TSA clearly means (biological) “sex,” not “gender.” 
 272 Id. (“[A]ll pat-downs are only conducted by same-gender officers.”). 
 273 Id. This policy survived an equal protection challenge in Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3-07-0892, 
2009 WL 9071049 at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2009). 
 274 One could argue that other justifications exist that could support same-sex pat-downs, such as 
the familiarity of employees with anatomy that resembles one’s own. Simple employee training, how-
ever, could address such concerns. 
 275 This logic of eliminating desire could lead to the conclusion that asexuality offers an ideal 
BFOQ here: an openly asexual officer could serve the task of not making anyone feel uncomfortable. 
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 373 (2014). 
 276 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 468–69 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
 277 David Cohen has observed that sex-segregating laws can be “mandatory, administrative, per-
missive [or] voluntary.” David Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 51, 55 (2011). Cohen notes that a legal movement towards stopping sex-segregated 
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lawmakers apply the equal burdens test. For example, the Department of Edu-
cation has issued regulations that permit sex segregation if educational oppor-
tunities are implemented in an “evenhanded” manner and are “completely vol-
untary.”278 Similarly, in decisions affirming sex-segregated restrooms and 
locker rooms, the equal opportunity and burden logic has prevailed. For in-
stance, the Tenth Circuit has held that “an employer’s requirement that em-
ployees use restrooms matching their biological sex does not expose biological 
males to disadvantageous terms . . . .”279 Both sexes are burdened with using 
separate bathrooms, so neither is disadvantaged.280 
                                                                                                                           
education—led by Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause and Office of Civil 
Rights of the Department of Education efforts—was reversed in 1996, especially with legislative and 
regulatory action, such as in the No Child Left Behind Act and explicit Department of Education per-
mission of sex-segregated education under Title IX. Id. at 62–65. Cohen discusses, for example, fed-
eral statutes that provide for sex-segregated housing for Army, Navy, and Air Force recruits in basic 
training, and a statute that requires that only drill instructors of the same sex as the recruits have ac-
cess to the recruits’ living quarters after the end of the training day. Id.at 78 (citing 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 4319–4320 (2012) (Army), 6931–6932 (Navy), 9319–9320 (Air Force)). Cohen discusses federal 
and state laws mandating sex-segregated bathrooms in specific locations, such as places of employ-
ment, schools, gas stations, restaurants, and hotels, and laws mandating sex-segregated bathrooms 
based on the presence of specific numbers of men and/or women in particular locations. Id. at 81–83. 
Cohen also discusses laws for prison segregation as well as athletics. Id. at 79, 109 (“[T]hese laws 
range from segregating the inmate population of an entire state’s penal system to the jails of particular 
localities to specifically applying to cells, rooms, apartments, bathing facilities, work opportunities, 
bathrooms, showers, educational and recreational programs, drug and alcohol rehab programs, death 
row, waiting areas pre-trial and chain gangs.”); see also EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, 
PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL IN SPORTS 34 (2008). See generally Debo-
rah L. Brake, Title IX as Pragmatic Feminism, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513 (2007). 
 278 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii)-(iii) (2015). 
 279 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the em-
ployer’s concern that “the use of women’s public restrooms by a biological male [employee] could 
result in liability” constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination under Title VII 
(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshores Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). But see supra notes 205–
208 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing recognition of transgender exceptions to this 
reasoning). 
 280 See Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x. 492, 493–94 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that employer satisfied its burden of providing evidence that it was motivated by safety, not 
by MTF transgender plaintiff’s sex, in refusing her access to women’s restrooms); Hispanic Aids 
Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 16 A.D.3d 294, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[Transgender individuals] 
were excluded on the same basis as all biological males and/or females are excluded from certain 
bathrooms—their biological sexual assignment. In this vein, we find the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (2001) to be instructive. In Goins, plaintiff claimed 
that defendant discriminated against her . . . by designating restrooms and restroom use on the basis of 
biological gender, in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. . . . Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the defendants’ designation of restroom use, applied uniformly, on the basis of ‘biological 
gender,’ rather than biological self-image, was not discrimination. We agree with this rationale . . . .”); 
Sullivan v. City of Cleveland Heights, 869 F.2d 961, 962 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he facility afforded to 
[ten-year-old plaintiff girl for changing clothes in public hockey arena] was substantially equal to the 
locker room utilized by the boys on her team . . . . [Plaintiff] was not accorded treatment unequal to 
that of the male hockey players, [therefore] it is unnecessary to consider whether the difference in the 
facilities was substantially related to an important objective.”). 
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In this area as well, transgender is the exception. Transgender-identified 
students have had some recent success in challenging sex segregation in bath-
rooms.281 For example, the Maine Supreme Court has recently determined that 
denying a fifth-grade, female-identified transgender student access to the fe-
male bathrooms constitutes sexual orientation discrimination in violation of the 
Maine Human Rights Act.282 The court extended the protection to the plaintiff 
by viewing her as exceptional. The sex-segregating norm itself was not con-
demned. The court underscored that its decision “rests heavily on [plaintiff’s] 
gender identity and gender dysphoria diagnosis, both of which were acknowl-
edged and accepted by the school” and that “[o]ur opinion must not be read to 
require schools to permit students casual access to any bathroom of their 
choice.”283 Only where “it has been clearly established that a student’s psycho-
logical well-being and educational success depend upon being permitted to use 
the communal bathroom consistent with her gender identity, denying access to 
the appropriate bathroom constitutes sexual orientation discrimination. . . .”284 
Unfortunately, a sex-segregating norm was strengthened rather than weakened 
in this important legal victory for transgender rights.285 
In general, when evaluating sex segregation in prisons, locker rooms, and 
bathrooms, courts have applied equal burden and opportunity rationales.286 If 
                                                                                                                           
 281 California recently became the first state to pass a law enabling students to use restrooms and 
join sports teams according to their gender identity, without proof of any medical diagnosis. See 
School Success and Opportunity Act, 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. 85 (A.B. 1266), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1251-1300/ab_1266_bill_20130812_chaptered.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QGM6-NFWC] (“A pupil shall be permitted to participate in sex-segregated school pro-
grams and activities, including athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his 
or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”). But see Steve Rothaus, 
Proposed Law Would Limit Transgender Protections Throughout Florida, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 6, 
2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/gay-south-florida/article9390389.html 
[https://perma.cc/3PEP-R797] (describing a proposed Florida bill that would provide a private cause 
of action against individuals who use single-sex facilities that are restricted to “persons of other bio-
logical sex”). 
 282 Doe, 86 A.3d at 607. The MHRA was amended to add “sexual orientation,” which includes 
gender identity, as a protected class. Id. at 605 n.5 (citing P.L. 2005, ch. 10, §§ 3, 17 (effective Mar. 
31, 2005)). 
 283 Id. at 607. 
 284 Id. 
 285 The dissenting judge continued to explore this idea of sex blindness that he found absurd. See 
id. at 609–10 (Mead, J., dissenting). 
 286 See, e.g., Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 975 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(“The statutes substantially further the government’s legitimate and important objective of segregating 
women inmates from male inmates while providing them with the same type of services that are avail-
able within the DOCR system.”); Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 615 (8th Cir. 1996) (“When 
considering single-sex prisons, the only logical and workable application of the definition of ‘program 
or activity’ under Title IX requires comparison of educational opportunities for female and male pris-
oners within the entire system of institutions operated by a state’s federally-funded correctional de-
partment or agency . . . .”); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The prohibit-
ed activity would be the offering of educational programs only in the men’s prisons, without offering 
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both sexes have similar access to a facility or are similarly burdened by a poli-
cy, sex classifications are typically upheld. The guiding principle is that indi-
viduals cannot be directly excluded from domains that are associated with so-
cial, economic, and political power. Male and female bodies, however, are reg-
ularly separated, ostensibly for their own protection, based on assumptions of 
sexual difference and heterosexual desire. 
In sum, legally permissible sex stereotyping today has many forms but 
can be classified into three main supporting rationales: cultural and community 
norms, real biological difference, and sexual danger and privacy. Various legal 
doctrines are used to support body stereotyping, but the most prevalent today is 
the equal burdens doctrine, which has been used to validate a range of sex-
based classifications, from dress and grooming codes to bathroom and prison 
separation. The following table summarizes these insights and contrasts them 
with the second branch of sex-stereotyping law, prohibited division-of-labor 
stereotyping: 
Table 1 
 “Division of Labor” Stereotyping Body Stereotyping 
Is Sex Stereotyping valid? No Yes 
Primary Rationale (s) 
 
* Representative Exam-
ples 
Anti-Subordination 
 
* Inclusion of women 
in VMI 
 
* Upholding Family 
and Medical Leave Act  
 
* Recognizing men as 
dependents 
 
* Recognizing men as 
caregivers 
 
1.Culture  
 
*Sex-based appearance 
policies 
 
2.Biology  
 
* Inferior status of un-
wed fathers 
 
* Intersex surgeries  
 
3. Sexuality 
 
*Sex-segregated jobs and 
spaces 
Primary Concept(s) of 
Gender  
“Gender Role” “Cultural/Community 
Norm”; “Disorders of 
Sex Development”; 
“Gender Dysphoria”   
Primary Equality Doc-
trine/Test 
Equal Opportunity Equal Burdens 
                                                                                                                           
equivalent programs in the women’s prison . . . .”); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. 
Mich. 1979) (holding that Equal Protection Clause does not require that men’s and women’s prisons 
have identical programs, it only requires programs “equivalent in substance if not in form”). 
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III. LIBERTY HARMS OF BODY STEREOTYPING 
Perhaps the primary harm of body stereotyping is better understood as a 
harm to liberty. Integrating the family and the market has been a primary goal 
of legal feminists, and this effort has centered on equality.287 As Part I demon-
strated, the equal opportunity doctrine that appeared in statutory and constitu-
tional sex discrimination law since the 1970s has promoted access to economic 
and social power.288 Women were granted access to the Virginia Military Insti-
tute, promoted to partnerships, and recognized as breadwinners.289 In a parallel 
shift, men were legally recognized as caregivers, homemakers, and nurses.290 
Despite these shifts in supporting access to economic and social power, 
the equal opportunity and burdens doctrines have also, as Part II has demon-
strated, supported multiple forms of body stereotyping.291 Currently lawful 
body stereotyping that does not fall conceptually under prohibited division-of-
labor stereotyping regularly violates individual liberty. Examples include man-
datory appearance codes in the workplace, in schools, and in prisons; unequal 
treatment of unwed fathers; exclusion from job opportunities in reliance on 
privacy BFOQs; sex segregation in bathrooms, locker rooms, prisons, or the 
military; and an ongoing practice of “corrective” surgery based on a theory that 
genitals must appear male or female.292 As illustrated in Part II and visualized 
in Table 1, equality doctrines have yielded limited success for individuals who 
have been harmed by such body stereotyping.293 
An individual liberty framework can yield better legal outcomes for such 
plaintiffs. This Part revisits the domains examined above to demonstrate that 
they are better conceptualized as liberty harms.294 It argues that courts and oth-
                                                                                                                           
 287 See notes 104–176 and accompanying text (focusing on the integration of both these spheres, 
including discussion of Olsen and Halley’s critique of the market/family binary). 
 288 See notes 104–176 and accompanying text; see also JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW 
THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 1–24 (2014) (arguing that equal opportunity efforts should focus 
on opportunity pluralism—broadening the range of opportunities available to people at every stage in 
life—rather than artificial concepts of literal equalization). 
 289 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
229, 257 (1989); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). 
 290 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730–31 (1982) (ruling that Mississippi University for Women’s single sex ad-
missions policy for its nursing school violated equal protection guarantees). 
 291 See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ias against female 
flight attendants infected [the airline’s] weight maximums for all age groups. Because of this con-
sistent difference in treatment of women and men we conclude that [the airline’s] weight policy be-
tween 1980 and 1994 was facially discriminatory.”). 
 292 See supra notes 179–286 and accompanying text 
 293 See Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 (2011) (argu-
ing that equality doctrines are limited by the requirement of finding comparators, who are similar to 
the complainant in all respects but for the protected characteristic). 
 294 See infra notes 295–319 and accompanying text. 
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er legal actors should elaborate and underscore those individual liberty harms 
even when litigating and deciding cases under traditional equality doctrines. 
A. Prioritizing Liberty Arguments 
Consider, for example, the personal appearance cases. Challenges to 
grooming and dress codes under Title VII frequently fail under the equal bur-
dens test, which is comparative by nature. Courts often conclude that both sex-
es are burdened by a given policy. The problem is that the equal burdens test, 
however, usually fails to capture the primary harm of grooming and dress 
codes: harm to personal liberty. Articulating claims against appearance policies 
as claims for liberty may generate more expansive results. In fact, in early 
grooming cases several courts, using a liberty rationale, rejected mandatory 
appearance codes. In 1972, in Donohue v. Shoe Corporation of America, for 
example, a federal court invalidated a hair length workplace policy for men, 
observing that the “tendency to stereotype people is at the root of some of the 
social ills that afflict the country.”295 Similarly, in a successful challenge to a 
workplace hair length policy, the Second Circuit commented that “choice of 
personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual’s personal liberty, and 
that any restriction on that right must be justified by a legitimate state interest 
reasonably related to the regulation.”296 This type of reasoning appreciates how 
policies that are based on sex stereotyping can violate the personal liberty of 
those subjected to them. 
Similarly, in the context of public schools in the 1960s and 1970s, courts 
reasoned explicitly from liberty to invalidate mandatory appearance codes.297 
For instance, in 1970, in Richards v. Thurston, the First Circuit held that sus-
pending a male high school student for refusing to cut his hair violated the stu-
dent’s due process right of personal liberty.298 The Seventh Circuit likewise 
held that a student’s right to govern the style and length of his hair is a person-
al freedom protected under the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.299 When litigators and courts perceive the harm 
of dress and grooming codes as a harm to personal liberty and individual 
choice, they have more robust grounds to invalidate these codes. By contrast, 
when courts engage the comparative test of equal burdens, even oppressive 
policies such as the one examined in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., can 
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survive judicial scrutiny when those policies seem to apply equally to men and 
women.300 
For unwed fathers as well, Due Process arguments have proven more 
productive than Equal Protection ones. In fact, the first time that the Supreme 
Court addressed the constitutional rights of unwed fathers, in Stanley v. Illi-
nois,301 the Court framed the issue “as a matter of due process of law.”302 The 
primary interest was understood by the Court to be “[t]he private interest [of] a 
man in the children he has sired and raised. . . .”303 The Court concluded that 
“[a]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness 
before their children are removed from their custody. It follows that denying 
such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois 
parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.”304 In other 
words, if all parents are entitled to this liberty interest, it should be equally dis-
tributed. 
Nevertheless, that emphasis on the liberty interest of unwed fathers in 
their children declined in later decisions. In Lehr v. Robertson, an unwed father 
claimed that his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when he was denied an oppor-
tunity to object to his biological child’s adoption.305 He claimed that “a puta-
tive father’s actual or potential relationship with a child born out of wedlock is 
an interest in liberty which may not be destroyed without due process of 
law.”306 The Court, however, held that there is no broad liberty interest for un-
wed fathers. Rather, only “when an unwed father demonstrates a full commit-
ment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate 
in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child ac-
quires substantial protection under the due process clause.”307 
In the absence of a meaningful liberty interest of unwed fathers in a rela-
tionship with their children, equal protection claims have had no bite. Thus, in 
Lehr, the Court could easily conclude that “[i]f one parent has an established 
custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned 
or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not pre-
vent a state from according the two parents different legal rights.”308 In Mi-
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chael H. v. Gerald D., the Court’s protection of the liberty interest of unwed 
fathers was narrowed further when Justice Scalia interpreted the liberty interest 
of fathers to “rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the historic respect-
indeed—sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally accorded to the 
relationships that develop within the unitary family.”309 
Although unwed fathers have typically asserted a combination of equal 
protection and liberty claims, the liberty right has been outcome determinative. 
Equal protection claims often fail due to perceived real biological differences 
between men and women. Future litigators and courts seeking to enhance the 
rights of unwed fathers should underscore the liberty interest that all individu-
als, male or female, have in a relationship with their children. 
Arguments for liberty are also central for ending the practice of early cor-
rective surgery on intersex infants. “Corrective” or “normalizing” surgeries on 
non-consenting intersex infants violate the most basic of protected liberties: 
the autonomy to make decisions regarding one’s own body in situations that do 
not constitute medical emergencies.310 As described above, this surgical prac-
tice has gained increased social and medical scrutiny since the 1990s. Today, 
courts are only beginning to assess the legal consequences of these surger-
ies.311 Most recently, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that “the alleged rights at 
issue in this case [including the bodily autonomy right not to be subjected to 
surgery] were not clearly established at the time of M.C.’s 2006 sex assign-
ment surgery,” and that it need not address the issue of whether the surgery 
violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.312 
Intersex “corrective” surgeries should not be viewed as a peculiar, stand-
alone practice that concerns only those with intersex conditions. Instead, inter-
sex surgeries constitute a fragment in the bigger social and legal fabric of re-
producing a male and female binary. There is no obvious equality harm in 
these surgeries. Classifying an individual as male or female via medical inter-
vention does not necessarily violate one’s equality vis-à-vis other humans. The 
real harm here is a liberty harm. A federal court has recently recognized this 
liberty harm when it denied a hospital’s motion to dismiss in a lawsuit of an 
individual who had been subjected to non-consensual surgery. The court found 
that “[they] violated [plaintiff’s] clearly established constitutional right to pro-
creation,” and that the complaint “state[s] a plausible claim that [they] violated 
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[plaintiff’s] procedural due process rights.”313 The Fourth Circuit overruled 
this decision.314 
Until very recently, courts and lawmakers had not scrutinized this type of 
sex stereotyping. Intersex surgeries do not have much to do with division-of-
labor stereotyping. When examined alongside other current lawful practices of 
sex stereotyping such as mandatory appearance polices, the law of unwed fa-
thers, and segregation of bodies and jobs, however, intersex surgeries vividly 
demonstrate the limits of equality doctrines and the need to shift the attention 
of courts and other legal actors to liberty from sex-stereotyping practices. 
B. Resisting Segregation 
When individuals are classified as male or female for the purpose of ex-
clusion from job opportunities or public spaces, they suffer a harm to their lib-
erty. The sex-based BFOQ exception should be viewed as a serious infringe-
ment on individual liberty.315 Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in 
hiring and work conditions includes the exception of sex when it is a BFOQ  
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.”316 Policies that attempt to protect customer privacy often presume 
male heterosexuality, female vulnerability, and opposite-sex desire. Consider 
the example, discussed above, of TSA’s current pat-down policy.317 Today, the 
mandatory same-sex pat-downs in airport security lines does not allow for an 
opposite-sex search even if an officer wishes to pat down customers of the op-
posite sex for a possibly legitimate reason.318 Although the policy was enacted 
to protect customers, a customer’s wish to be patted down by an officer of the 
opposite sex would also be denied under this policy. The consequence is a 
broad limitation on liberty and individual choice. 
Likewise, when sex segregation occurs in prisons, locker rooms, and 
bathrooms, courts have applied equal burden and opportunity rationales.319 If 
males and females have similar access to a facility or a program or are per-
ceived to be similarly burdened by a policy, sex-based classifications are regu-
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larly upheld. Male and female bodies are regularly separated, ostensibly for 
their own protection, based on assumptions of sexual difference and hetero-
sexual desire. Although these types of sex-based segregation are usually sup-
ported by interests in individual safety and privacy, they often end up violating 
individual liberty. 
CONCLUSION 
Every generation has its social and legal truths about sexual difference. A 
century ago, not many were puzzled by Justice Bradley’s observation in the 
first sex discrimination case decided by the Court that “the domestic sphere . . . 
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.”320 Today, there 
are other social and legal truths.  These include that “a sign that says ‘men on-
ly’ looks very different on a bathroom door than a court-house door;”321 that 
“the mere existence of a biological link [between father and child] does not 
merit . . . constitutional protection;”322 and that “employers are allowed to rely 
upon stereotypical notions of how men and women should appear.”323 
The present task is to be puzzled by gender so that it remains a useful cat-
egory for legal analysis.324 The gender event of the 1970s was primarily about 
access to social and economic power. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court adopted 
a new rationale regarding the harm of sex stereotyping, anti-subordination; a 
new concept of gender, “gender role”; and a new articulation of an equality 
principle, equal opportunity. These conceptual shifts have supported a gender 
revolution in which the equal opportunity doctrine was a useful legal tool for 
integrating the family and the market. Unfortunately, in the same years, a par-
allel branch of permissible sex stereotyping has flourished. It is based on rea-
soning from cultural and community norms, “real” biological difference, and 
heterosexual risk and privacy. This branch rests on a narrow concept of equali-
ty. The 1970s gender revolution, its grounding in anti-subordination, and its 
supporting equal opportunity doctrine have not been useful legal tools for 
those marginalized by currently permitted forms of body stereotyping. 
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In Frontiero v. Richardson, Justice Brennan described the ideal of female 
domesticity as “[n]ot . . . a pedestal, but . . . a cage.”325 In what has essentially 
been a spheres revolution, the idea of equal opportunity and the concept of 
gender role have operated together to destroy an ideology that subjected men 
and women to unequal traditional roles of homemaker and breadwinner. It is 
time to conceptualize legal reforms for the twenty-first century that would 
identify and mend instances in which gender—once a liberating concept—has 
turned into a cage. 
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